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UNBURDENING THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD:




"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."' With these
words in the 1992 case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court
ushered in a new era of abortion regulation.2 Speaking through a joint
opinion authored by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court
indicated that from this point forth abortion regulations would be judged
by an "undue burden" standard. According to this standard, an abortion
regulation is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion" of a
nonviable fetus.3
The Justices who wrote Casey were explicit in their desire to resolve
the judicial debate over constitutional protection of abortion. This de-
bate had become increasingly contentious in recent years as several Jus-
tices forcefully expressed their willingness to overturn the 1973 Roe v.
Wade4 decision constitutionalizing abortion. Casey, however, may have
the opposite effect. The joint opinion made clear that the Constitution
does protect a woman's right to choose abortion prior to viability of the
fetus. But the extent of this protection was left in doubt as a result of the
Court's failure to provide methods for determining when an undue bur-
den on abortion exists.
This Note attempts to rectify this deficiency in the Casey undue bur-
den standard by developing a new undue burden methodology based on
the analytical approaches used in other areas of constitutional jurispru-
dence. Three approaches-the two-tiered inquiry of the dormant Com-
merce Clause,5 the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis of the First
Amendment,6 and the endorsement test of the Establishment Clause 7 -
are especially similar to the undue burden standard outlined in Casey and
can provide methods for evaluating the purpose and effect of abortion
regulations.
In developing a new undue burden methodology, this Note for the
most part works within the framework of the undue burden standard as
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (majority opinion).
2. In this Note the term "regulation" is used broadly to refer to any restriction on
access to abortion, including restrictions that are found in statutes. This broad definition
conforms to the Court's terminology in Casey. See id. at 2820 (joint opinion).
3. Id.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 2.
7. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 1.
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enunciated in Casey. The joint opinion authors clearly stated that the
undue burden standard represented "a standard of general application to
which we intend to adhere."8 Hence, a new undue burden methodology
must be compatible with the joint opinion's account of the undue bur-
den standard if it is to have practical utility. This Note distinguishes, how-
ever, between the theoretical framework of the undue burden standard
and the joint opinion's application of the standard to the Pennsylvania
regulations at issue in Casey. Although the methods extrapolated from
other constitutional approaches accord with the former, they often con-
flict with the latter. Such a distinction is justified by Casey's failure to
explain how the undue burden standard should be applied and the in-
consistencies in its review of the Pennsylvania regulations.
At the same time, this Note also seeks to underscore the weakness of
the standard in the form specified by the joint opinion. The comparison
to other constitutional analyses demonstrates that the abortion undue
burden standard is virtually unique in its lack of protection against un-
necessary and unjustified burdens on a constitutionally protected right.
To some extent, developing a new undue burden methodology based on
the techniques used in other areas of constitutional jurisprudence can
serve to enhance the level of protection offered by the undue burden
standard. But in order to provide significant protection against unneces-
sary or unjustified burdens it is necessary to reconfigure the theoretical
framework of the Casey undue burden standard. Although this Note fo-
cuses primarily on developing a new methodology that is consistent with
the existing form of the undue burden standard, it also suggests one
means of reconfiguring the undue burden standard so as to increase the
protection of a woman's right to choose abortion.
Part I discusses the current undue burden standard and explains why
it is necessary to develop a more concrete methodology for applying the
standard. Part I also justifies the approach of developing such a method
by drawing on other areas of Constitutional jurisprudence. Part II exam-
ines the two-tiered analysis used under the dormant Commerce Clause,
compares this analysis to the undue burden standard, and suggests how
certain methods used in dormant Commerce Clause analysis could be
applied to the context of abortion. Part III examines the analysis applied
to content-neutral regulations of speech in traditional forums and the
endorsement test of the Establishment Clause, again compares these ap-
proaches to the undue burden standard, and extrapolates methods for
applying the undue burden standard. Part IV applies these suggested
methods to the restrictions at issue in Casy to demonstrate the potential
protection that could be secured through a more rigorous undue burden
inquiry. Part IV also explores one means of altering the framework of the
undue burden standard so as to increase its protection of the right to
choose abortion.
8. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992) (joint opinion).
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I. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD
The Casey undue burden standard marked a substantial change in
the Supreme Court's approach to abortion. Previously, the Court had
examined abortion regulations using the trimester framework developed
in Roe. Although the trimester framework had been attacked in decisions
which shortly preceded Casey, the Justices had not yet developed a re-
placement approach. Casey introduced an undue burden standard that
demands inquiry into the purpose and effect of abortion regulations.
However, the joint opinion's failure to provide a systematic methodology
by which to apply the standard undermines the standard's force. This
failure may lead to expanded judicial discretion as well as regional vari-
ance in women's access to abortion, and thereby deprive some women of
their constitutional rights. An examination of the analytic approaches
used in three other areas of constitutional jurisprudence-the two-tiered
inquiry of the dormant Commerce Clause, the content-neutral, tradi-
tional forum analysis applied to regulations on expression, and the en-
dorsement test of the Establishment Clause-suggests methods for apply-
ing the undue burden standard.
A. Pre-Casey Abortion Doctrine: Roe and Its Progeny
Constitutional protection for a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion began with the 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. In the years pre-
ceding Roe the Court had determined that the Constitution provides a
fundamental right to privacy and decisional autonomy which prevents the
government from intruding into certain areas of individuals' lives, such as
their choices regarding contraception. 9 In Roe the Court held that"[t]his
right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."10 Yet the Court also argued
that the abortion context was different from other areas of decisional au-
tonomy because important state interests were involved, namely concern
for the health of the woman and for potential human life. The Court
adopted the trimester approach as the means of balancing the woman's
privacy right and the state's interests. During the first trimester of preg-
nancy, neither state interest was deemed strong enough to justify state
interference with the woman's decision. Increased medical risks allowed
state regulation of abortion during the second trimester, but only if the
regulation was aimed at protecting maternal health. At the end of the
second trimester, when the fetus became capable of surviving outside of
the womb, the state's interest in potential life became compelling.
Therefore, at this point the state could proscribe abortion, provided it
9. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a married couple's
use of contraception is protected by the right to privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (extending the right of privacy announced in Griswold to the use of contraception
by unmarried individuals).
10. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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allowed exceptions when necessary to preserve the life or health of the
woman.11
Roe established that under the trimester approach restrictions on
pre-viability abortions would be subjected to strict scrutiny. Such restric-
tions would only be sustained if they were "narrowly tailored" to achieve a
"compelling state interest."12 Over the next sixteen years the application
of the trimester approach and strict scrutiny led to the invalidation of a
variety of abortion regulations. In the first major abortion case after Roe,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,'8 the Court struck down a number of regu-
lations, including laws that mandated husband consent for abortions for
married women, required physicians to preserve the life and health of the
fetus at every stage of pregnancy, and banned the use of saline amni-
ocentesis. 14 In the 1983 case City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health (Akron I)15 the Court invalidated regulations requiring "informed
consent," waiting periods, and hospitalization for second trimester abor-
tions. 16 Three years later, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists,17 the Court again struck down "informed consent" re-
quirements, as well as regulations mandating the filing of detailed reports
that were to be made available to the public.18
Several regulations, however, were sustained by the Court under the
trimester approach. Primary among these were regulations requiring pa-
rental notification or consent before an abortion could be performed on
a minor, which the Court sustained when ajudicial bypass procedure was
provided. 19 Additionally, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment and
other restrictions on public funding of abortion, even when funding for
childbirth was provided or the abortion was medically necessary.20
11. See id. at 162-64.
12. Id. at 155.
13. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
14. See id. The Court also struck down' a Pennsylvania statute that required a
physician to use the degree of care most likely to protect the fetus in Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
15. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
16. See id. Hospitalization requirements for second trimester abortions were also
struck down in Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
17. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
18. See id. Thornburgh also invalidated a two physician requirement for all post-
viability abortions, including those performed because of a medical emergency. The
Pennsylvania regulations challenged in Thornburgh were later amended and in their
amended form were the abortion regulations at issue in Casey.
19. See, e.g., Ashcrofl, 462 U.S. at 490-93 (striking down a notification requirement
that did not include a bypass).
20. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding ban on funding for
medically necessary abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (upholding ban on the
use of publicly financed hospital services for abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(upholding ban on funding for non-medically necessary abortions combined with funding
for childbirth); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (upholding ban on funding for non-
medically necessary abortions).
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The Court's approach to abortion began to change noticeably with
its decision in the 1989 case Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,2 1 where
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion openly criticized the trimester ap-
proach and urged that abortion regulations only be subjected to rational-
ity review. 22 The regulations at issue in Webster declared that life begins at
conception, banned the use of public employees and facilities for per-
forming abortions, and required testing for viability at twenty weeks.
Although the Court sustained the regulations, five Justices refused to use
Webster as an occasion for reconsidering Roe.23 The Court upheld restric-
tions on minors' abortions in two cases subsequent to Webster, but again
did not overturn the trimester framework of Roe.24
B. Casey: The New Undue Burden Standard
1. The Casey Opinion. - Casey involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's
abortion regulations, amended in 1988 and 1989 to replace those struck
down by the Court in 1986.25 The new regulations contained the follow-
ing measures: an "informed consent" requirement, which included a
state-specified physician lecture; a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting
period following the lecture; a husband notification requirement; an "in-
formed" parental consent requirement; and extensive recordkeeping and
reporting requirements. 26 The regulations also contained exceptions
from these requirements for medical emergencies, narrowly defined as
conditions so dangerous that any delay would create a serious risk of sub-
stantial or irreversible harm.27
21. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
22. See id. at 517-19. For a description of the evolution of the Court's approach to
abortion, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 139-96 (1990).
23. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 517-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White and Kennedy,
JJ., arguing for an abandonment of the Roe framework), at 525-26 (O'ConnorJ, refusing
to reconsider the validity of Roe), at 532-37 (Scalia, J., arguing for an overt overruling of
Roe), at 537-38 (Blackmun, J.,joined by Brennan and Marshall,JJ., arguing for upholding
Roe), at 561 (Stevens, J., refusing to modify Roe).
24. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
26. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205-09, § 3214 (Supp. 1994). As part of the
mandated lecture, a physician must inform a woman seeking an abortion of the risks of
pregnancy and childbirth and the probable gestational age of the fetus. In addition, the
physician or an assistant must do the following: tell her that she may be eligible for
medical benefits for prenatal care and childbirth; tell her that the father is liable for child
support; and offer her materials prepared by the state that list agencies providing
alternatives to abortion, describe the fetus, and contain depictions of the fetus at two-week
gestational increments. This information need not be provided if the physician can prove
she reasonably believed that doing so would have a "severely adverse effect" on the woman,
and the statement about paternal liability may be omitted in cases of rape. See id. § 3205.
The Pennsylvania act also included a ban on sex-selection abortions. See id. § 3204(c);
infra note 130 and accompanying text.
27. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3203 (Supp. 1994).
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Most of these measures had previously been declared unconstitu-
tional under Roe's trimester framework. 28 In Casey, however, all of the
measures except for the husband notification requirement were upheld,
while the medical emergency exception was held to apply whenever com-
pliance with the regulations would "pose a significant risk to the life or
health of a woman."29 Yet at the same time the Court maintained its
continuing adherence to Roe. The Court reached this incongruous result
by reading Roe's central holding as being simply the claim that women
have a constitutional right to choose abortion prior to the viability of the
fetus. The joint opinion, by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter re-
affirmed the Court's commitment to this right but rejected the trimester
framework as "misconceiv[ing] the nature of the pregnant woman's inter-
est... [and] undervalu[ing] the State's interest in potential life."30 The
woman's right is "[the] right to make the ultimate decision, not to be
insulated from all others in doing so."31
In place of the trimester approach, the joint opinion adopted an un-
due burden standard as the test by which to judge restrictions on pre-
viability abortions. According to the joint opinion, "[a] finding of an un-
due burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion."3 2 Thus, the undue burden standard is com-
posed of two prongs, one of purpose and one of effect. In order to satisfy
the purpose prong, the state cannot seek to hinder a woman's choice or
enact a regulation "designed to strike at the right [to choose abortion]
itself."33 But the state is allowed to seek to persuade a woman to carry her
pregnancy to term and to express a preference for childbirth.3 4 The ef-
fects prong is fact-sensitive; it requires a case-by-case investigation into all
of the effects of a regulation, both intended and incidental.35 Further,
these effects must be calculated from the perspective of those women for
whom the regulation is a restriction, not by measuring its effect on all the
women to whom it applies.36 A regulation may be struck down even if it
only imposes a substantial obstacle on one percent of the women it af-
fects.37 Although the undue burden standard was criticized by the six
other Justices, it has become the test by which abortion regulations are
28. See notes 12-18 supra and accompanying text.
29. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992) (majority
opinion).
30. Id. at 2818 (joint opinion).
31. Id. at 2821.
32. Id. at 2820.
33. Id. at 2819.
34. See id. at 2818, 2821.
35. See id. at 2819-20, 2825-26, 2833.
36. See id. at 2829-30 (majority opinion).
37. See id.
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now reviewed since it represents the "narrowest grounds" on which the
Justices concurred.3 8
The joint opinion retained fetal viability as the crucial line for abor-
tion regulation. The opinion argued that at the point of viability in-
dependent life becomes a realistic possibility, so that the state is justified
in overriding the rights of the woman; moreover, "it might be said that a
woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's inter-
vention."3 9 After viability, states can proscribe abortion except where
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Before viability,
any regulation found to impose an undue burden on access to abortion is
unconstitutional. But if no undue burden is found, regulations will be
upheld if they are reasonable. 40 Any restriction on abortion access where
a woman seeks to end a pregnancy that poses a "significant threat to [her]
health" is unconstitutional.4 1
The Casey undue burden standard marked a shift from a bright-line
test to a more subjective exercise in which judges determine the weight of
a regulatory burden. Rather than simply striking down any regulations
that impose more than a de minimis burden on first trimester abortions,
judges must now examine the burden imposed by a regulation and deter-
mine if this burden is too heavy.42 Casey also indicated that this examina-
38. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (holding is position taken by
Justices concurring on narrowest grounds when Court is fragmented); Elizabeth A.
Schneider, Comment: Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1003,
1004-05 (1993). Several courts have applied the undue burden standard as the Court's
new test of abortion regulations. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1339
(1993) (citing Casey as authoritative for the review of abortion regulations).
39. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (joint opinion). The Court also retained viability for
reasons of stare decisis. See id.
40. See id. at 2821.
41. See id. at 2822 (majority opinion).
42. See Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1151,
1154-56 (1993); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829 (majority opinion) (distinguishing
between a regulation which makes abortion a little more difficult to obtain and one which
imposes a substantial obstacle). The fact that some non-de minimis burdens on abortion
access may be acceptable under the undue burden standard also means that challengers of
abortion regulations now bear the burden of proving that regulations are unconstitutional,
whereas defendants had borne the burden of proof under Roe. See Kolbert & Gans, supra,
at 1155.
The extent to which judges will examine the burden imposed by abortion regulation
will depend upon their interpretation of the scope of the Casey opinion. One possible
interpretation views the opinion as offering a new standard by which abortion regulations
should be judged and ruling on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's regulations, while
another perceives Casey as additionally deciding the constitutionality of certain types of
abortion regulations. Compare Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526,
530-33 (8th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that a twenty-four hour waiting period requiring two
visits is not clearly constitutional after Casey) with Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992) and Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F.
Supp. 1482, 1488, 1495 (D. Utah 1994) (claiming twenty-four hour waiting periods
requiring two visits are clearly constitutional after Casey). According to this second
2031
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tion of the weight of burdens should take regulatory context into ac-
count.43 The result of this shift is a change in acceptable state purposes
and the degree of scrutiny by which regulations are reviewed. 44 The
Court allowed state intervention not only to express a preference for
childbirth but further to seek actively to persuade a pregnant woman to
carry to term. This represents a notable divergence from the post-Roe
insistence that "regulations designed to influence the woman's informed
choice between abortion and childbirth" are unjustified.45 Casey also low-
ered the review accorded to abortion regulations from the strict scrutiny
approach of Roe and its progeny. A restriction on pre-viability abortions
no longer needs to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest;
rather, if the restriction does not constitute an undue burden it needs
only to be reasonably related to the legitimate state interest in protecting
fetal life.46
The combination of reasonableness requirements and a prohibition
on undue burdens makes it difficult to determine the strength of review
accorded to abortion regulations after Casey. Casey's reference to substan-
tial obstacles as unconstitutional, and its emphasis on balancing the inter-
ests of the state and the pregnant woman, might suggest that the Court is
now applying a form of intermediate scrutiny.47 But this conclusion
seems unlikely given the use of rationality review to examine regulations
approach, Casey has foreclosed facial challenges to restrictions such as waiting periods and
mandatory lectures. See Utah Women's Clinic, 844 F. Supp. at 1488, 1495. The frequent
statements in Casey that the Court's holding was based on the record before it, and the
subsequent repetition of this point by two of the joint opinion's authors, support the
former interpretation. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26, 2833 (joint opinion); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 911 (1994) (Souter, J., denying stay of mandate);
Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in denial of stay). At a minimum, these comments suggest that the Court was
allowing for the possibility that in some contexts certain regulations, such as the waiting
period requirement, might not be constitutional. Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (joint
opinion) with id. at 2825-26.
43. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26, 2833 (joint opinion), at 2845 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (comments limiting holding to record before the Court).
44. See Martha A. Field, Abortion Law Today, 14J. Legal Med. 3, 11-13 (1993).
45. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983).
46. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (joint opinion).
47. See id. at 2805-07 (majority opinion), at 2816-20 (joint opinion). Sullivan
implies that the Court may be applying such an intermediate scrutiny approach, although
she notes that lesser burdens are only subjected to rationality review. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 33-34 & n.70, 60-62 (1992) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Supreme Court]; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 315 (1993). For a
definition of intermediate scrutiny see Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny requires that regulations serve "important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed [are] ... substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives").
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imposing burdens not considered to be substantial obstacles.48 It is par-
ticularly noteworthy that Casey appeared to allow states to impose restric-
tions on aboriion not amounting to undue burdens in order to achieve a
legitimate interest, as opposed to the important or substantial state inter-
est requirement usually employed under intermediate scrutiny.49 In
practice, the strength of the scrutiny applied to abortion regulations will
depend on how high a threshold the Court sets for a finding of undue
burden. If this threshold is low, the strength of review will be more like
intermediate scrutiny, since a greater number of regulations would be
examined searchingly. That the Court upheld almost all of the regula-
tions challenged in Casey suggests that the Court will in fact set a high
threshold and perhaps only find a substantial obstacle when a regulation
serves as the equivalent of outlawing abortion for those women it af-
fects.50 If such a high threshold is used, most regulations will be upheld
and the undue burden standard will collapse into little more than ration-
ality review.
The claim that Casey offers less than intermediate scrutiny is but-
tressed by the absence of any balancing in the abortion undue burden
standard. A central characteristic of the Court's usual approach to stan-
dards that require "due" treatment is a balancing of the countervailing
interests and values at stake in a particular context. In its due process
jurisprudence, for instance, the Court has distinguished between the pro-
48. In general, rationality review is less demanding than intermediate scrutiny.
Government purposes need only be legitimate, and the regulation merely reasonably
related to achieving them. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Moreover, the Court has applied rationality review very deferentially, asking only if the
regulation could be valid under a hypothetical state of facts and not requiring that the
stated purpose actually have motivated the legislature. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 1439-43 (2d ed. 1988). However, the Court has on occasion developed
a more searching, rationality-with-bite approach that it has applied in the substantive due
process and equal protection context. For a discussion of the rationality-with-bite
approach and its applicability to the abortion context, see infra notes 188-191 and
accompanying text.
49. The Court's comments on this point are inconsistent. On the one hand, the
Court claimed that the state "has a substantial interest in potential life," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2820 (joint opinion), while at others it referred to Roe for the proposition that the state has
a "legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn." Id. at 2817.
Since the Caseyjoint opinion criticizes the weight given to the state's interest in potential
life in Roe and its progeny, see id. at 2817-20, a comparison of these comments alone
would suggest that the Court is replacing Roe's strict scrutiny with heightened scrutiny, and
reclassifying the interest in potential life as substantial. But these comments must be
integrated into the rest of the joint opinion, in particular the acceptance of regulations
serving "a valid purpose" so long as they do not create undue burdens and the fact that the
Court did not require substantial interests when it applied the standard. For example, the
Court upheld the record-keeping requirements without any examination of the strength of
the state's interest in health. See id. at 2832-33. Justice Blackmun interpreted the joint
opinion as allowing restrictions on abortion to serve interests deemed only legitimate. See
id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
50. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829 (majority opinion).
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cess due a welfare recipient before benefits are revoked and that due a
disability recipient, based on such contextual factors as the urgency of
need and the types of evidence at issue.51 Indeed, the use of balancing is
implied by the very term "undue burden," which suggests an examination
of the justifications offered in defense of a regulation as well as of the
extent of its effects. Despite this jurisprudential precedent and linguistic
implication, the abortion undue burden standard only analyzes the quan-
tity of burdens imposed. An abortion regulation that is found to impose
a burden amounting to a substantial obstacle is unconstitutional, regard-
less of the benefits it also may bring; correspondingly, a regulation that is
found not to impose a substantial obstacle is upheld no matter how few
benefits it brings, provided it is rational. 52
The absence of any balancing in the abortion undue burden stan-
dard weakens the strength of judicial scrutiny because it means there is
little protection against two types of burdens. The first are burdens that
do not amount to substantial obstacles but are more burdensome than
necessary to realize a legitimate purpose. Protection against such unnec-
essary but not undue burdens would require an examination of alterna-
tive abortion regulations, since otherwise it is difficult to discern that a
regulatory burden is avoidable. However, the undue burden standard
forecloses such an examination; a rational regulation that does not create
a substantial obstacle to abortion access is upheld even if an alternative
regulation would be equally effective but less burdensome.
The second type are burdens that neither amount to substantial ob-
stacles nor are unnecessary, yet serve less important legislative goals such
as administrative convenience. 53 In order to provide protection against
such "unjustified" burdens the Court must balance the importance of the
legislative goal against the significance of the burdened interest. Ration-
ality review fails to protect against such burdens because it only prohibits
arbitrary regulations that serve no legitimate purpose and provides no
means of determining the relative importance of legislative goals.
51. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 340-42 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 260-64 (1970). Such balancing also figures in the Court's examination of undue
burdens in the dormant Commerce Clause area, see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the problems with balancing as a mode of constitutional analysis,
see generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale
L.J. 943 (1987).
52. It could be argued that the joint opinion adopted a balancing approach in
crafting the undue burden standard, balancing the woman's liberty interest and concerns
of stare decisis with the state's interest in potential life. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805-06
(majority opinion), at 2816-17 (joint opinion); Sullivan, Supreme Court, supra note 47, at
79-81. But this use of balancing in crafting the undue burden standard did not extend to
employing balancing in applying the standard, as is demonstrated by the lack of protection
against unnecessary but not undue burdens.
53. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that while administrative
convenience is a legitimate governmental objective, it does not justify the use of gender
stereotypes).
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2. The Weaknesses in the Undue Burden Standard. - Casey thus estab-
lished a new analytic framework, the undue burden standard, by which
abortion regulations would henceforth bejudged. But although the joint
opinion outlined the theoretical form of the standard and defended its
underlying principles, the opinion offered little guidance on how the
standard should be applied. In the words of Justice Scalia, after high-
lighting certain facts in the record, "the opinion then simply announces
that the provision either does or does not impose . .. an 'undue bur-
den.'"54 For example, the opinion failed to explain how the effects of
regulations should be calculated, how much of an effect is necessary for a
finding of undue burden, or what types of effects are relevant. In addi-
tion, the purpose prong received strikingly little attention. The opinion
failed to indicate how regulations "calculated to inform the woman's free
choice" will be differentiated from those calculated to "hinder it."55 This
failure is notable given that any attempt to "inform" the woman's choice
will likely include measures that have the effect of at least temporarily
hindering this choice.5 6 In short, Casey provided no methodology for
identifying a purpose to create an undue burden or for determining
when a regulation creates an undue burden through its effects.
57
The lack of guidance about how to apply the undue burden standard
is worsened by inconsistencies in the joint opinion. The Court referred
to empirical studies of domestic violence in striking down the husband
notification requirement, but made no reference to the empirical evi-
dence of the harmful effects of parental consent requirements.58 Indeed,
it did not examine the factual record at all in sustaining the informed
parental consent requirement.5 9 Perhaps most notably, the Court ac-
knowledged the extensive evidence in the record of the burdens imposed
by waiting periods, but nonetheless upheld the waiting period require-
ment on the grounds that the district court had not specifically found
54. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
55. See id. at 2820 (joint opinion).
56. See id. at 2877 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); Field, supra note 44, at 14-15.
57. The approach to the undue burden standard taken by Blackmun and Stevens
provides additional confusion for judges seeking guidance in applying the undue burden
standard. Stevens argued that the waiting period and "informed consent" requirements
failed rationality review, and Blackmun argued that the joint opinion "erred" in sustaining
most of the provisions. See Casey, 112 S. CL at 2842-43 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), at 2845 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163,
206-10 (1992) [hereinafter The Supreme Court, 1991 Term]. Several of the amici briefs
submitted in Casey provided evidence of the harmful effects of parental consent and
notification requirements. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Alan Guttmacher Institute
et al. at 7-8, 12, Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2791 (Nos. 91-744, 91-902); Brief Amici Curiae of the
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al. at 25-29, id.
59. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (joint opinion).
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that this requirement would create a substantial obstacle. 60 In addition,
the joint opinion argued that the husband notification requirement re-
lied on a conception of women as subject to their husbands' authority, a
conception that is "repugnant to our present understanding of marriage
and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution." 61 Yet the
opinion discounted the restrictive understanding of women's decisional
autonomy that underlay the state mandated lecture and waiting period
requirements. 62
Casey's methodological deficiencies cannot be rectified by reference
to earlier enunciations of the undue burden standard. Justice O'Connor
had been arguing for the undue burden standard since her dissent in
Akron I in 1983.63 But the Casey undue burden standard differs signifi-
cantly from the version O'Connor developed in Akron L Her earlier for-
mulation defined an undue burden as an "absolute obstacle[ ] or severe
limitation[ ]" and did not inquire into the purpose of a regulation until
after the existence of such a burden had been proven.64 Moreover, the
question of whether an undue burden existed was only a threshold in-
quiry; after finding an undue burden, O'Connor then applied strict scru-
tiny to determine whether the undue burden wasjustified.6 5 In Casey the
Court explicitly acknowledged the transformation of the undue burden
standard from its previous incarnation, stating that despite earlier sugges-
tions "[i]n our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitu-
tional burden."66 Nor can a method for applying the undue burden stan-
dard be drawn from other abortion cases. Although Casey argued that
the undue burden standard had been applied in earlier cases, 67 there
seems to be little support for this claim. Several cases used the term "un-
due burden"; however, none articulated a standard of review. 68 The term
60. See id. at 2825-26.
61. Id. at 2831 (majority opinion).
62. See id. at 2841-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Field,
supra note 44, at 14 n.39.
63. 462 U.S. 416, 453, 462-66 (1983) (O'ConnorJ, dissenting); see also Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529-30 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
828 (1986) (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
64. See Akron , 462 U.S. at 463-64.
65. See id. at 463; see also Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics:
Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 133-35 (1989).
66. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 (joint opinion).
67. See id. at 2819. But see id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (undue burden standard "created largely out of whole
cloth"); id. at 2876 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (earlier cases
did not use undue burden standard).
68. See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (parental consent
statute imposes "undue burden" as construed by Massachusetts Supreme Court); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (woman protected from "unduly burdensome"
interference with right to seek abortion); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314
(1980) (quoting Maher's formulation).
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was used repeatedly in only one case, Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), but again
without any theoretical development.
69
It might be argued, as Justice Stevens did, that Casey's failure to
enunciate the details of the undue burden standard is not problematic
because such details will emerge over time.70 But in fact the lack of a
methodology for applying the standard has serious consequences. First,
it leads to unconstrained judicial discretion. To some extent, increased
judicial discretion is inherent in any highly fact-based standard. 71 The
absence of a systematic methodology, however, expands the realm of dis-
cretion significantly, since judges determine what evidence is relevant
and how it should be weighed. Such extreme discretion can serve to un-
dercut the Court's legitimacy, which as the Casey opinion recognized, de-
pends on the belief that the Court's decisions are grounded in
principles.72
Moreover, the failure to develop a methodical analysis of the undue
burden standard perpetuates the inconsistency of rulings on abortion.
Casey aimed, at least in part, to provide guidance for lower courts strug-
gling to apply an incoherent post-Webster abortion doctrine to a multitude
of new abortion regulations. 73 The lack of a methodology for applying
the undue burden standard means that the inconsistency in lower court
rulings will continue, as seen in post-Casey decisions. For example, a fa-
cial challenge to a twenty-four hour waiting period requirement in North
Dakota was allowed, while a similar challenge was dismissed in Utah as
frivolous.74 Despite Casey's repeated reference to ruling only on the rec-
ord before it, some courts have refused to engage in a factual analysis of
abortion regulations and instead simply have applied Casey's specific
69. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Bellotti I represented a challenge to Massachusetts' parental
consent law. In holding that the district court should have abstained pending construction
of the statute by the state courts, Justice Blackmun argued that "a requirement of written
consent ... is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion."
Id. at 147 (emphasis added). However, Blackmun used the term "undue burden" as a
shorthand for the Court's earlier decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976), and never indicated that he meant to replace the Roe trimester framework with a
new standard. In addition, since the Court's decision turned on abstention doctrine and
not on the acceptability of the statute, Bellotti I provides little clarification of how undue
burdens should be measured.
70. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2843 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
71. See id. at 2848 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sullivan,
Supreme Court, supra note 47, at 58-59.
72. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (majority opinion).
73. See id. at 2803-04.
74. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1994)
(allowing facial challenge, although ultimately sustaining waiting period requirement);
Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1487, 1495 (D. Utah 1994) (stating
that "[b]ecause the two visit requirement is constitutional in Pennsylvania, it must also be
constitutional in Utah" and ordering plaintiffs to pay costs for frivolous lawsuit).
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holdings.75 Yet regulations that are not burdensome in Pennsylvania may
well be burdensome in other states where there are fewer abortion prov-
iders or a more rural and poorer population. Thus some women may be
denied effective exercise of their constitutional right to choose abortion.
C. Three Constitutional Models: Potential Sources of a Methodology for the
Undue Burden Standard
A comparison of the undue burden standard to three other constitu-
tional approaches provides a methodology for applying the undue bur-
den standard and highlights the inadequacies of the standard as enunci-
ated in Casey. These approaches are the two-tiered inquiry of the
dormant Commerce Clause, the content-neutral, traditional forum analy-
sis applied to regulations on expression, and the endorsement test of the
Establishment Clause. Two questions, in particular, could be raised
about this comparative analysis. First, why is the Court's approach in
other constitutional areas relevant to developing a methodology for ap-
plying the undue burden standard? Second, accepting that the Court's
approach in other constitutional areas might be relevant, why focus on
these three models?
The first question is based on the belief that the tests the Court ap-
plies in different areas reflect concerns that are specific to that area and
cannot simply be transplanted. The strongest argument for this claim is
Casey's description of abortion as a "unique act," different from other
private choices because of its effect on the fetus, the woman's family and
society.7 6 Yet while Casey acknowledged that abortion is unique in this
sense, the opinion denied that the right to choose abortion is distinct
from the rest of constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, it situated the
abortion right at the intersection of two important lines of decisions up-
holding individual rights, those relating to bodily integrity and to repro-
ductive and familial autonomy. 77 Casey also indicated the relevancy of
comparison to other areas of jurisprudence by drawing on models used
in other areas to justify the undue burden standard.78
75. See, e.g., Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656
(1992) (Mississippi statute sufficiently similar to Pennsylvania's so as to preclude the need
for further evidentiary proceedings); see also supra note 42.
76. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (majority opinion).
77. See id. at 2810-11 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
278 (1990), for bodily integrity doctrine, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for
reproductive autonomy, and Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), for
familial autonomy).
78. See id. at 2818 (joint opinion) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983), where early filing requirements for independent candidates were invalidated).
The Court's language suggests that the use of the undue burden standard serves to make
review of abortion regulations more similar to review of other fundamental rights. See id.
("As ourjurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has realized, not every
law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipsofacto, an infringement of that
right.") Some commentators have questioned this claim, arguing that fundamental rights
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In addition, it is important to distinguish between the standard used
in an area ofjurisprudence and the methods for applying that standard.
Occasionally such methods may arise from concerns peculiar to a particu-
lar constitutional provision.79 More often, however, the analytical meth-
ods apply to other areas of law, provided an appropriate rationale is pres-
ent. A central example is the Court's use of the strict scrutiny
methodology. Initially developed as a means of determining whether leg-
islation unconstitutionally distinguished among members of different
races, strict scrutiny was then expanded to apply to fundamental rights
and adapted to address gender discrimination.80
A similar criticism might be that developing a systematic methodol-
ogy de novo is better than extrapolating methods from other areas. How-
ever, adapting existing analytical methods has the advantage that the
Court is already familiar with these methods and has already explored the
details of their application. As a result, the Court can use accepted meth-
ods from other constitutional approaches to immediately systematize a
new standard. Adaptation of existing analytical methods also preserves
the consistency of constitutional jurisprudence as a whole, thereby en-
hancing the court's ability to claim that its decisions are principled and
not simply ad hoc in nature. 81
The second question relates to the selection of the dormant Com-
merce Clause inquiry, the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis and
the endorsement test as comparisons to the undue burden standard.
Casey emphasized that the results reached by applying the undue burden
standard would be dependent on the specific facts of a case. Each of
these comparison approaches similarly involves a case-by-case, fact-inten-
sive analysis. The Casey opinion also defined the undue burden standard
as a two-pronged, purpose and effect inquiry. Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and the endorsement test represent purpose and effect
inquiries. Finally, the crux of Casey is the application of an undue burden
standard to abortion regulations. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
represents the predominant use of an undue burden standard in consti-
are generally protected by strict scrutiny, which the undue burden standard explicitly
disallows. See Schneider, supra note 38, at 1028-29; Fallon, supra note 47, at 315.
79. One example is the overbreadth doctrine of the First Amendment, which allows
individuals to challenge laws restricting freedom of expression on the grounds that the
laws would be unconstitutional as applied to third parties. The Court made an exception
to the general prohibition on asserting the rights of third parties out of fear that the law
may have a chilling effect on protected speech. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law
1191-92 & nn.4-5 (12th ed. 1991).
80. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (specifying strict scrutiny for
race); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to the
fundamental right to vote); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(applying intermediate scrutiny for gender).
81. Several commentators adopt holistic or thematic approaches to the Constitution
and to adjudication generally. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 410-13 (1986); Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 1689-93
(1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences]; Tribe, supra note 48, at 1-22.
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tutional jurisprudence prior to Casey. All three comparison approaches
also resemble the abortion undue burden standard in that they can be
categorized as, at best, a form of intermediate scrutiny. Methods em-
ployed in these approaches thus can be extrapolated to the abortion con-
text without reinserting strict scrutiny into the Court's review of abortion
regulations.8 2 These approaches therefore serve as useful comparisons to
the Casey undue burden standard. 83
II. THE DoRMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE UNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD
Under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine the Court engages
in a two-tiered, fact-sensitive inquiry that analyzes the purpose and effect
of state regulations and determines whether these regulations constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce. An examination of this in-
quiry demonstrates the comparative weakness of the abortion undue bur-
82. For a description of the dormant Commerce Clause and traditional forum
approaches as instances of intermediate scrutiny, see Sullivan, Supreme Court, supra note
47, at 61. While it might be argued that strict scrutiny applies under the Establishment
Clause, the endorsement test appears to use a more intermediate form of review in that it
allows accommodations of religion that do not amount to endorsement. See Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'ConnorJ, concurring). The level of scrutiny
applied under the Casey undue burden standard as a whole is less than intermediate
scrutiny, since unnecessary but not undue burdens and unjustified burdens are only
subjected to rationality review. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. Even so,
the methods extrapolated from these approaches do not increase the scrutiny of abortion
regulations beyond the strength of review indicated in Casey. These methods are used in
determining whether or not an undue burden exists, rather than in reviewing regulations
found not to constitute an undue burden.
83. These three analyses also are more appropriate comparisons than other similar
standards used in constitutionajurisprudence. For example, while Takings Clause analysis
requires a highly fact-specific inquiry into the extent of a burden on an individual, see
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), the multi-dimensional character of
property rights differs substantially from the indivisible liberty interest in abortion.
Further, while the Court may uphold regulations that substantially burden property if such
regulations can be said to provide benefits to the owner as well, see Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980), only under a paternalistic approach can substantial
interference be said actually to benefit pregnant women seeking an abortion. The
approach used in conjunction with the Free Exercise clause might seem analogous to the
abortion undue burden; however, under the Free Exercise clause even substantial
incidental burdens are considered constitutional, whereas according to the undue burden
standard incidental burdens are unconstitutional if they create substantial obstacles.
Compare Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992) (joint opinion) with
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Lastly, the undue burden standard might be compared to equal protection analysis, which
also utilizes a purpose and effect inquiry. But equal protection analysis requires a finding
of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect, whereas either a purpose or
effect of creating substantial obstacles violates the undue burden standard. Compare
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820 with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976). In
addition, under equal protection analysis, the aim is to determine whether a comparative
difference in effect exists, whereas under the undue burden standard the focus is on the
quantitative effect.
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den standard, particularly in regard to unnecessary but not undue bur-
dens. This examination also suggests three techniques that could be
incorporated into a methodology for applying the abortion undue bur-
den standard: the per se rule against facial discrimination, the surrogacy
test, and the cumulative effects principle.
Ak The Two-Tiered Inquiry of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Ever since 1824 the Supreme Court has viewed Congress' constitu-
tional power to regulate interstate commerce as implicitly limiting the
states' regulatory ability.8 4 These limits, which developed into the dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine, have undergone several permutations
over the years and have become increasingly potent restrictions on state
legislation.8 5 The classic statement of the Court's current dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine was offered in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:86
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.87
The current analysis can be seen as composed of two tiers of review.88
The first tier determines if a state statute discriminates against interstate
commerce or regulates interstate commerce directly, in which case the
statute is generally declared to be invalid without further examination.8 9
The rationale for the virtual per se invalidity of discriminatory legislation
is that such discrimination, when it represents economic protectionism
84. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
85. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945)
(state regulations constitutional where state interest outweighs burden on interstate
commerce); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (state regulations with only an
indirect impact on interstate commerce are constitutional); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320-21 (1851) (states may regulate where local subject matter and
uniformity are not required).
86. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
87. Id. at 142 (citations omitted). The fact that dormant Commerce Clause doctrine
requires "even-handed" regulations, whereas the abortion undue burden standard allows a
state to express a preference for childbirth, does not prevent a useful comparison between
these two standards. Both approaches are concerned with identifying illegitimate
purposes, namely economic protectionism and discrimination in the former area and
intentional creation of substantial obstacles in the latter. See text accompanying notes
101-104.
88. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
578-79 (1986).
89. See id. at 579. For examples of this first-tier review, see Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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against other states, strikes at the heart of national union.9° Not all dis-
criminatory legislation is protectionist, however. Given the interdepen-
dence of state and national economies and the different economic spe-
cializations of states, many state regulations could burden out-of-state
interests more than in-state. 91 As a result, the first-tier rule of per se inva-
lidity applies mainly to statutes that the Court believes were motivated by
economic protectionism or that embody such discrimination on their
face. 92 Statutes that serve a legitimate purpose but facially discriminate
against interstate commerce are upheld only if non-discriminatory alter-
natives are unavailable. 93 Statutes that have clear discriminatory effects
without a clear discriminatory purpose are subjected to second-tier bal-
ancing, but the state bears the burden ofjustifying the legislation.9 4
The Court moves to the second tier of review if the statute is deemed
"even-handed," advancing a "legitimate," non-discriminatory interest and
imposing only "incidental" burdens on interstate commerce. Here the
Court claims to apply a balancing approach, weighing the burden the
statute places on interstate commerce against the local benefits it
brings.95 In its balancing process, the Court considers whether less bur-
densome alternatives are available but is reluctant to challenge a state
legislature's assessment of the utility of legislation. 96 Some commenta-
tors have argued that despite its stated doctrine, the Court does not in
fact utilize second-tier balancing in most dormant Commerce Clause
cases.9 7 Nonetheless, second-tier balancing continues to play an impor-
90. According to the Court, economic protectionism is incompatible with the
"principle that our economic unit is the Nation," H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 537 (1949), and the constitutional principle "that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together," Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). See
also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1112-15 (1986) (economic
protectionism is theoretically and practically incompatible with national union).
91. See Regan, supra note 90, at 1163; Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations
Against Interstate Commerce, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1203, 1208 (1986).
92. See Smith, supra note 91, at 1239-46.
93. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of CIarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1683 (1994);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). Since it is possible for discriminatory
legislation to be upheld, the first tier of review is known as embodying virtual per se
invalidity.
94. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353
(1977).
95. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
579 (1986). For examples of this second tier of review, see Kassel v, Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-79 (1981); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351-54; Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-46 (1970).
96. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64, 470 (1981)
("States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative
judgments."). Where the Court has struck down statutes on the grounds that less
burdensome alternatives are available, there often has been evidence of discrimination.
See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-51; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
97. Donald Regan has offered the most important attack on second-tier balancing.
According to Regan, the only coherent rationale for striking down state regulations on
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tant role in transportation and tax cases, and occasionally also surfaces in
movement-of-goods cases.98 When the Court strikes down state legisla-
tion on dormant Commerce Clause grounds under either tier, it does so
claiming that its inquiry determined that the legislation is an "undue bur-
den" on interstate commerce.
B. A Comparison of the Two-Tiered Dormant Commerce Clause Inquiry and
the Undue Burden Standard
A comparison of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis and abor-
tion undue burden standard demonstrates notable similarities in the ap-
proaches the Court uses in these two areas, as well as some significant
differences. The most overt similarity is that in both areas the Court
strikes down statutes on the grounds that they impose an "undue bur-
den." Thus, for each, the conclusion that the statute creates an undue
burden is enough to deem it unconstitutional.99 In addition, although
the Court does not describe the dormant Commerce Clause approach as
a purpose and effects inquiry, the two-tiered review effectively performs
such an analysis. The first tier constitutes an investigation into whether
dormant Commerce Clause grounds in movement of goods cases is that the regulations
were motivated by a protectionist purpose. See Regan, supra note 90, at 1092, 1101-27.
Justice Scalia also has attacked the balancing aspect of dormant Commerce Clause analysis
for its lack of textual basis in the Constitution and its unsuitability for the judicial function.
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 896-98 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265,
259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For other critical
approaches to the dormant commerce clause that offer more radical solutions, see Julian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425, 442-43, 446-57
(1982) (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause analysis should be dispensed with
altogether in favor of Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause); Martin H. Redish &
Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 Duke L.J. 569, 591-98, 606-12 (same).
98. Regan explicitly acknowledges balancing plays a role in transportation and tax
cases. See Regan, supra note 90, at 1104. One movement-of-goods case where the Court
chose to engage in balancing, rather than pursue an inquiry into discriminatory purpose, is
Bendix, 486 U.S. at 891 ("The Ohio statute before us might have been held to be a
discrimination that invalidates without extended inquiry. We choose, however, to assess
the interests of the State ... ."). See also Aleinikoff, supra note 51, at 966 n.143 (arguing
that despite Regan's claims, the Court does balance state interests against the burden on
interstate commerce in some "movement-of-goods" cases).
99. Therefore, by clarifying that an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden in
Casey, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820-21 (1992) (joint opinion),
the joint opinion brought abortion undue burden analysis into line with this aspect of the
Court's use of undue burden in the dormant Commerce Clause area. Dormant Commerce
Clausejurisprudence represented the primary use of undue burden analysis prior to Casey.
The other uses of the term "undue burden" were primarily cases relating either to
discovery orders, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), or to the effect of due process requirements on
government, see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435 (1982); see also
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (requiring compelling interest for
restriction of mental patients would be an "undue burden" on the state). In neither type
of case has the term been used extensively or to represent a standard.
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the purpose of the legislation was to discriminate against interstate com-
merce, while the second tier represents an examination of the effects of
the legislation on interstate commerce. Similarly, Casey established a pur-
pose and effects inquiry to determine whether a regulation imposed an
undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion.' 00
Under both the dormant Commerce Clause and abortion undue
burden standards, a statute will be deemed unconstitutional if it is en-
acted to serve a purpose that is not "legitimate" or "valid."' 0 ' Both define
an illegitimate purpose as one that directly undermines the right in-
volved, where the resulting effects cannot be deemed "incidental."10 2 In
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the illegitimate purpose is eco-
nomic protectionism and discrimination; in the abortion context, it is the
intentional creation of substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seek-
ing to abort a nonviable fetus. Moreover, in neither context has the
Court indicated the extent to which an illegitimate purpose must be pres-
ent in order to invalidate a statute. Under dormant Commerce Clause
analysis the Court will sometimes invalidate laws when there is any evi-
dence of an illegitimate purpose, but on other occasions move to second
tier balancing despite such evidence. 10 3 Casey similarly provided little
guidance on how prominent an illegitimate purpose must be before an
abortion restriction can be struck down.
One difference between the purpose requirements of the two stan-
dards is that in the abortion context the state does not need to be even-
handed. Rather, it can express a preference for childbirth and adopt
measures to further its interest in potential life, provided that these meas-
ures do not create substantial obstacles to abortion access. This differ-
ence does not prevent a comparison of the two standards, since both in-
volve determining whether an illicit purpose exists. Casey's apparent
100. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
101. Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819 (joint opinion) (statute must serve a valid
purpose) with Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (statute must serve a
legitimate public interest).
102. Compare Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819 (joint opinion) (law which has incidental
effects not amounting to an undue burden is constitutional) with Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
(effects on interstate commerce must be only incidental).
103. Compare C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994)
(striking down on first tier review a town's requirement that all nonhazardous waste be
processed at a facility within the town although the requirement could be seen as a means
of financing a public enterprise rather than as a means of fostering local businesses) with
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down on second
tier review a state limitation on the length of trucks, although the statute could be seen as
protectionist because it contained exemptions for local businesses). One reason why the
Court may not have felt it necessary to address the issue of how much illegitimate purpose
is required to invalidate a statute under the dormant commerce clause is that illegitimate
purpose is not a necessary requirement for unconstitutionality under that clause, see
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1986), as it is in equal protection analysis, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45
(1976). Thus the Court avoids a difficult inquiry into the level of illegitimate purpose by
turning to balancing.
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willingness to accept a broader range of purposes, however, will make
attempts to prove that regulations were enacted because of illegitimate
purposes more difficult in the abortion context than in the area of inter-
state commerce. A fine line distinguishes expressing a preference for
childbirth from intending to create substantial obstacles to pre-viability
abortions. 10 4
The two standards are also similar in requiring an inquiry into the
effects of a statute, even if the statute has a legitimate purpose. The ef-
fects prong of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is embodied in the
second tier of review. In both, factors such as increased costs and delays,
even if incidental, may prove to be undue burdens. 10 5 But the effects
prong of the dormant Commerce Clause and abortion undue burden
analyses are notably different in two respects: in abortion undue burden
analysis, as noted earlier, there is no balancing and no examination of
alternative regulations. The absence of balancing in the undue burden
standard lessens the protection against unnecessary but not undue bur-
dens as well as against unjustified burdens.10 6 In addition, the lack of an
examination of alternatives makes the purpose inquiry of the undue bur-
den standard more difficult, since examination of alternative approaches
is useful as a means of flushing out illegitimate purposes. The fact that a
legislature chose to enact more burdensome regulations over equally ef-
fective alternatives suggests that its intention was to hinder, and not to
inform, the abortion decision. The Court explicitly uses its examination
of alternatives to perform this flushing-out function in the dormant Com-
merce Clause area.10 7
One final difference between the two approaches deserves notice.
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis rests on issues of intergovernmental
relations and economic policy, whereas the abortion undue burden stan-
dard seeks to accommodate fundamental concerns of personal autonomy
and potential life. As a result, a comparison between the two might seem
inapposite. However, the impact of this difference in underlying con-
cerns is not clear. The Court is notably unwilling to overturn economic
regulations, 0 8 yet it is more willing to act in regard to the dormant Com-
merce Clause because Congress has unlimited power to overrule dormant
104. See Field, supra note 44, at 15; see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2877 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Any regulation... that is
intended to advance ... the State's 'substantial' interest in protecting unborn life will be
'calculated [to] hinder' a decision to have an abortion." (emphasis omitted)).
105. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-20 (joint opinion); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674; Raymond
Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 438-39,439 n.14 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520, 524-28 (1959).
106. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
107. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-91 (1955) (holding




Commerce Clause decisions.10 9 In any event, these differences would
seem more likely to affect the Court's response to identified burdens
than the methods it uses to identify them.1 10
C. Dormant Commerce Clause Techniques and Their Application to Abortion
Undue Burden Analysis
In its dormant Commerce Clause analysis the Court uses certain
methods to flush out illegitimate purpose and to calculate the burdens
that a regulation imposes. Several of these methods, namely the per se
rule against facial discrimination, the surrogacy test, and the cumulative
effects principle, can be incorporated into the abortion undue burden
standard. The following sections describe these three methods and dis-
cuss how they could be applied in the abortion context.
1. The Per Se Rule Against Facial Discrimination. - One of the central
techniques employed in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is a virtual
per se rule against facial discrimination. Any regulation that on its face
imposes greater burdens on out-of-state residents than on in-state resi-
dents is almost always struck down as unconstitutional."' The per se rule
is useful as an evidentiary device; the presence of discrimination on the
face of a regulation is a reliable indication that it was enacted to serve a
discriminatory purpose." 2 This rule relieves the Court of the difficult
task of assigning a discriminatory purpose to the entire legislature on the
basis of remarks made by particular legislators. If discrimination is evi-
dent in the language of a regulation, then the legislature that enacted
these words can be said to have intended to discriminate without the
Court having to "psychoanalyze [the] legislators."" 3  Since the per se
rule serves to flush out the discriminatory purpose that led to a regula-
109. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1992).
110. Moreover, the three methods taken from dormant Commerce Clause analysis-
the per se rule, the surrogacy test and the cumulative effects principle-are present in the
Court's individual rights jurisprudence, although in a less easily extrapolated form. See,
e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) (importance of facial evidence
of purpose); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (concern
with minorities' ability to affect political processes); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 801 (1989) (need to measure cumulative effects).
111. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (1979) ("Such facial discrimination by itself may be a
fatal defect .... At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny
112. See Regan, supra note 90, at 1135. In addition, the Court has explicitly defined
economic protectionism as extending to discriminatory means as well as discriminatory
purposes. See City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978) ("[T]he evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends."). Thus a state
cannot defeat the rule against facial discrimination simply by demonstrating that a
legitimate purpose motivated a regulation's enactment.
113. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The possibility of avoiding attributing unacknowledged purposes to legislators explains the
popularity of facial evidence in other instances of motive review. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
383-84.
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tion's enactment, the Court usually will strike down a regulation in its
entirety if the state does not meet its justificatory burden, rather than
determine whether the discriminatory provision is severable." 14
The rule is not absolute, however. A statute that is facially discrimi-
natory is subjected to "the strictest scrutiny."" 15 A state must demonstrate
that its statute is worthwhile and motivated by a legitimate purpose and
that non-discriminatory alternatives are unavailable. The Court has
rarely accepted such arguments, but the possibility means that facial dis-
crimination is not absolutely prohibited."16
The Court has applied the per se rule against facial discrimination
quite broadly."17 The obvious cases involve laws that clearly forbid inter-
state commerce in an item,"18 limit the ability of out-of-state companies
to enter an in-state market, 1 9 or require economic operations to be per-
formed in-state.' 20 But the Court has also applied the per se rule to inval-
idate laws where facial discrimination was less clear, such as regulations
preventing only some interstate firms from entering a local market,' 2 ' or
imposing restrictions on commerce originating outside of a state subdivi-
114. But see Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 802-04 (1992) and Sporhase v.
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982) for two instances where the Court was
willing to consider severability.
115. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
116. For an instance when the Court did accept this argument, see Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986). For commentators' reactions to the per se rule, see Eule, supra note
97, at 461-63 (opposing the per se rule); Regan, supra note 90, at 1134-36 (supporting
the virtual per se rule).
117. The broad application of the per se rule appears to deviate from the Court's
usual principle of construing statutes so as to avoid constitutional violations where possible.
See EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568,575 (1988); Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,346 (1936). The Court's willingness
to forego its usual restraint can be explained by the fact that the per se rule is used to flush
out illegitimate purpose, rather than to identify illegitimate effects. Deferential
constructions of statutes can ensure that illegitimate effects are avoided, but cannot ensure
that illegitimate motivations are prevented. In addition, the Court has indicated that there
are limits to the ability of judges to construe statutory language so as to preserve
constitutionality. One such limit is that judges cannot offer statutory interpretations that
ignore the clear language of a statute. See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n,
484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (principle only applies where statute is " 'readily susceptible'" to
a construction that would make it constitutional) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
118. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 131; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337-38; City of Philadelphia v.
NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978).
119. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949).
120. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970). There are suggestions
that the Court may consider statutory exemptions which benefit local industries to be a
form of facial discrimination, although it has also supported its conclusions in such cases
with second-tier balancing. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662, 676-77 (1981) (using balancing to strike down law that limited truck lengths, despite
presence of exception for major in-state industries).
121. See Lewis, 447 U.S. at 39-42.
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sion.122 Similarly, the Court has invalidated regulations that contain
retaliatory clauses, even though these clauses are not inherently discrimi-
natory since they may serve to exempt a complying state from non-dis-
criminatory burdens it would otherwise face.123
The virtual per se rule against facial discrimination is equally applica-
ble to the abortion context, where the inquiry also involves determining
whether an illegitimate purpose exists. Recent abortion decisions, in-
cluding Casey, have demonstrated that the Court is uncomfortable with
evaluating legislative motivation in this area.1 24 Use of a per se rule
would enable the Court to give substance to the purpose prong of the
undue burden standard without having to impute unconstitutional mo-
tives to legislators. The lack of an even-handedness requirement under
abortion undue burden analysis does not defeat the applicability of the
per se rule; indeed, this difference could be said to make the rule even
more necessary since the lack of an even-handedness requirement ren-
ders the inquiry into legislative purpose more difficult. 125
The first step in extrapolating the per se rule is determining the
form the rule should take in the abortion context. The fact that states
may express a preference for childbirth precludes a per se rule against
regulations that facially single out abortion for special treatment, such as
regulations that impose waiting periods for abortions but not for other
surgical procedures. Instead, the appropriate form of a per se rule in the
abortion context is a rule against regulations that facially impose substan-
tial obstacles to pre-viability abortions or facially seek to hinder access to
abortions. A regulation would trigger the per se rule only if it facially
hindered access to abortion in a large fraction of the cases where it was
relevant. In Casey the Court held that abortion regulations need not be
invalid in all circumstances to be struck down on a facial challenge; it is
sufficient that in "a large fraction of the cases in which [the regulation] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle on a woman's choice to
undergo an abortion." 26 The Court would be able to draw on judicially
122. See C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677, 1682-83 (1994);
Fort Granuit Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019,
2023-26 (1992).
123. Retaliatory clauses remove barriers to the importation of one state's products
into another provided the second state does the same. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982); Smith, supra note 91, at 1240-41. The Court has
indicated that some reciprocity agreements may be constitutional. See Great Ad. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 378 (1975) (voluntary reciprocity agreement conferring
mutual benefits is not per se violation of the Commerce Clause).
124. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832-33 (1992) (joint
opinion); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron II), 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990).
125. See supra text accompanying note 104.
126. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (majority opinion). Justices O'Connor and Souter
subsequently reaffirmed this position. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909,
910 & n.2 (1994) (Souter, J., denying stay of mandate); Fargo Women's Health Org. v.
Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669 (1993) (O'ConnorJ, concurring in denial of stay). But see
Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 113 S. Ct. 633, 633-34 (1992) (Scalia,
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noticeable facts as well as regulatory language in determining that a regu-
lation violates the per se rule. The use of the large fraction threshold and
judicially cognizable facts accord with the Court's broad application of
the per se rule in the dormant Commerce Clause area. 127 As is the case
under dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court should not sever
provisions that violate the per se rule, since the rule is used to identify an
illegitimate purpose behind the enactment of the statute as a whole.
There are two additional differences in the form of the rule in the
abortion context. First, because an undue burden on pre-viability abor-
tions is unconstitutional, a state may not justify a statute that violates the
per se rule by claiming that no alternatives are available, as is possible in
dormant Commerce Clause review. Rather, the state must prove that the
legislation is motivated by a legitimate purpose and will not in fact impose
an undue burden on pre-viability abortions, despite its facial appearance.
Secondly, since there is no balancing in abortion undue burden analysis
the state need not prove that the statute is worthwhile, even though the
absence of its postulated benefits likely would be relevant in disproving
the state's claim of legitimate purpose.128
At first glance, it may be difficult to see the need for a per se rule
against statutes that facially impose substantial obstacles, given Casey's
holding that any regulation that clearly imposes undue burdens on pre-
viability abortions is unconstitutional. Thus, for example, Casey clearly
invalidates statutes imposing universal bans on abortion.129 A review of
recent abortion legislation demonstrates that a per se rule might be ad-
vantageous in at least five contexts: bans on sex-selection abortions; bans
purporting to allow wide exceptions; bans on abortions after a legisla-
tively determined viability point; choice of method requirements; and leg-
islative declarations that life begins at conception. The regulations at is-
J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (Casey did not overrule existing facial challenge doctrine
that statute must be sustained unless there is no set of circumstances in which it could be
constitutionally applied); see also Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 656 (1992) (same). The comments by Justices O'Connor and Souter on the
import of Casey should be given greater weight since they wrote the joint opinion, whereas
Justice Scalia dissented from the adoption of the undue burden standard. For the claim
that the large fraction approach is consistent with the Court's general treatment of facial
challenges, see Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. 235, 272-74 (1994). It is important to note the differences between a facial challenge
and the per se rule. A facial challenge is a legal action arguing that it is clear from a
statute's language that the statute will operate unconstitutionally. The per se rule, on the
other hand, is an evidentiary device that could be used in a facial challenge.
127. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (statute
struck down as discriminatory because practical effect is to protect major local industry
against interstate competition). For a description of the broad application of the per se
rule in the dormant Commerce Clause area, see supra notes 117-123 and accompanying
text.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
129. See Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1414 (1993);Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 870 (D. Utah 1992).
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sue in Casey included a prohibition on sex-selection abortions that was
not challenged.130 The per se rule would apply to such a prohibition,
because the statute would act as a substantial obstacle for all women seek-
ing an abortion on these grounds. While such a ban might be struck
down under Casey in any case, the advantage of applying the per se rule is
that it would relieve challengers of the burden of proving that the legisla-
tion either was motivated by a purpose of imposing substantial obstacles
or that it will impose such obstacles in fact. Instead such unconstitutional
purpose or effect is presumed, and the state would bear the burden of
proving otherwise.
The per se rule also would strike down abortion bans that allow wide
exceptions, such as Puerto Rico's ban on any abortions not necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother. 31 A Puerto Rican court upheld
the ban on the basis of an extremely broad definition of health that in-
cludes "the most ample notions of physical, mental and socioemotional
well-being." a3 2 Under the per se rule, however, statutes would be judged
according to their actual text. Aspects of socio-emotional well-being,
such as economic or education desires, are not usually classified as health
concerns. Therefore, the statute would violate the per se rule unless a
broad definition of health was actually incorporated into the text of the
statute by the legislature. In addition, the statute would need to state
explicitly that it is up to the woman, and not her doctor or the state, to
determine whether an abortion is necessary for her health. Otherwise
the language of the statute would not give women ultimate control of the
abortion decision. Although it might appear that there is little difference
in practice between having the law struck down or upheld with a broad
definition of health, one potential benefit of the former is that as long as
the law exists it is possible for the state to force women and doctors to
justify abortions. The state also might be able to impose reporting re-
quirements under the law that are costly and threaten confidentiality.
Lastly, there is precedential value in not allowing any pre-viability bans on
abortions to be judicially upheld.
The per se rule against facially undue burdens would have even
more significant effects on another type of abortion ban, namely prohibi-
tions on terminating a pregnancy after a legislatively determined point of
viability. Utah has enacted legislation that defines viability at twenty
weeks gestational age and prohibits almost all abortions subsequent to
that point.' 33 In Casey the Court claimed that, irrespective of when viabil-
130. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3204(c) (Supp. 1994). For a discussion of this
provision in regard to Casey, see Field, supra note 44, at 19-20. Although sex-selection
abortions are problematic for many defenders of abortion rights, this category of abortions
cannot consistently be distinguished from other abortions while adhering to a principle of
women's bodily autonomy.
131. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4010 (1983).
132. Pueblo v. Najul Bez, 114 P.R. Dec. 493, 495 (1983) (translated from original)
(reaffirming Pueblo v. Duarte Mendoza, 109 P.R. Dec. 596, 607-08 (1980)).
133. See Utah Code Ann. 76-7-302 (Supp. 1994).
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ity occurs, it is "the attainment of viability... [that] continue [s] to serve as
the critical fact."134 At twenty-one weeks gestation, the point at which the
Utah ban takes effect, very few fetuses will be viable.13 5 The Utah district
court sustained the ban, arguing that twenty-one weeks represented "the
time of possible fetal survival." 13 6 Under the per se rule, however, the ban
would be struck down since on its face the ban clearly imposes an undue
burden on some pre-viability abortions.' 3 7 A similar result should obtain
in relation to any attempt to ban abortions after a legislatively determined
point of viability, unless it was apparent that viability would have been
reached in all cases.
A strong argument also can be made that viability testing require-
ments at any early date violate the per se rule because such tests will sub-
stantially increase the cost of an abortion. In Webster the Court upheld a
presumption of viability at twenty weeks, despite evidence that tests for
viability might increase the costs of abortions by $125 to $250 or more.'3 8
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that "the tests will undoubtedly show
in many cases that the fetus is not viable."' 39 The fact that the testing
requirement would prove unnecessary in most cases, however, demon-
strates that it facially imposes a substantial obstacle on many pre-viability
abortions. Under the per se rule, the statute would be held unconstitu-
tional unless the state could prove that in fact a substantial obstacle will
not be imposed.
134. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2811-12 (1992) (majority
opinion). The Court had previously held that the point of viability should not be
legislatively defined but instead left to the physician's judgment. See Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-89
(1979). Danforth's prohibition of legislative definitions of viability remains good law.
135. In Webster, for example, the Supreme Court accepted a lower court's ruling that
the earliest point of viability is twenty-three and a half to twenty-four weeks of gestation.
See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1989) (plurality
opinion); F. Gary Cunningham et al., Williams Obstetrics 168-69 (19th ed. 1993) (viability
generally occurs between 24 and 28 gestational weeks); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 686 F. Supp. 1089, 1121 (1988), injunction clarified by 736 F. Supp. 633 (1990),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (citing study suggesting 23.5 to 24 weeks as earliest point of viability).
136. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 873 (D. Utah 1992) (emphasis added).
137. The district court justified its action on the grounds that no abortions after
twenty weeks were currently being performed in Utah. See id. at 873-74. Under the per
se rule, however, the focus would be on the language of the statute and not the current
situation in Utah. Since most fetuses between twenty-one weeks and twenty-four weeks
gestation are not viable, see supra note 135, the ban facially will operate as a substantial
obstacle on a large fraction of the cases where it would be relevant. The district court also
claimed that since twenty weeks was sufficient notice for the pregnant woman, the ban did
not represent an undue burden "whether the fetus is non-viable or viable after the twenty
week period." Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. at 874. This conclusion is inconsistent with Casey,
which reaffirmed that prohibitions on pre-viability abortions are unconstitutional. See
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816 (majority opinion).
138. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 514-15 (plurality opinion).
139. Id. at 519.
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It is necessary to define facially undue burdens broadly in order for
the per se rule to apply to viability testing, because it is not obvious that a
testing requirement will impose undue burdens on abortion.' 40 The
Court's willingness to apply the per se rule broadly in dormant Com-
merce Clause context lends support to such an approach. 14' A broad
application of the per se rule is fair, because a state has the opportunity
to demonstrate that it is not actually creating an undue burden. The
ability of states to express a preference for childbirth through abortion
regulations prevents the per se rule from applying to every abortion re-
striction that might impose a burden. Nonetheless, the rule could be
applied to instances where there is clear evidence that an undue burden
would be created without infringing on this ability.
A fourth type of measure that might trigger the per se rule is choice
of method requirements, which mandate that a physician use the method
which is most likely to preserve the life of the fetus in performing an
abortion. In many cases the method most likely to preserve fetal life may
increase the risk to the woman. 142 Some choice of method requirements
expressly require that the woman bear a substantial health risk. For ex-
ample, Utah requires that physicians performing post-viability abortions
use the method that, in their best medical judgment, provides the fetus
with the best chance of survival unless doing so will cause the woman's
death or grave damage to her health.' 43 According to Casey, however,
any regulation that imposes a significant health risk on the woman repre-
sents an undue burden.-" Therefore, any choice of method provision
that expressly requires a woman to bear a significant health risk, or that is
not limited to apply only where there would be no significant health risk
to the woman, would violate the per se rule.' 45
140. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor claimed the additional cost would be
minimal. See id. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 117-123.
142. For example, the safest method for second trimester abortions is dilation and
evacuation. See Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. at 9, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84-495). However,
there is no possibility of fetal survival following this procedure since it involves
dismembering the fetus. See id. at 7; Cunningham, supra note 135, at 680. Other
methods of abortion that may offer a greater chance of preserving the fetus, such as
prostaglandin instillations, may cause severe gastro-intestinal side effects and involve an
additional risk for women with certain medical conditions. See Brief of the ACLU, supra,
at 7-8.
143. See Utah Code Ann. 76-7-307 to 308 (Supp. 1994). The Utah statute requires
physicians in exercising their best medical judgment to include a wide variety of factors
that are relevant to the well-being of the woman. See id. 76-7-304.
144. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992) (majority
opinion).
145. Thus, for example, the Utah provision would violate the per se rule since its use
of "grave damage" rather than "significant risk" leaves open the possibility that women
would be forced to bear a greater health risk than is constitutional. See Utah Code Ann.
76-7-307 to 308 (Supp. 1994).
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Finally, the per se rule would apply to abortion regulations that con-
tain facial evidence of a legislature's desire to prevent abortions, such as
regulations declaring that life begins at conception. The preamble of the
abortion statute challenged in Webster declared that life begins at fertiliza-
tion. The Court upheld the preamble, on the grounds that by its terms
the preamble did not actually regulate abortion.146 However, such a dec-
laration is relevant not only because of its effect on abortion regulations,
but also because of the evidence it provides of legislative purpose.147 The
fact that the legislature included a declaration that life begins at concep-
tion in its abortion regulations supports the conclusion that its purpose
in enacting the regulations was to hinder access to abortion. Although
the state stipulated that the fetus had only those rights consonant with
Supreme Court decisions, it may have done so in order to ensure that
abortion would be prohibited in Missouri without further legislative en-
actment if the constitutional protection of abortion were removed. 148
Thus the per se rule should be applied, and the state forced to prove that
its purpose was not in fact to hinder access. Further, the entire statute
and not just the preamble should be struck down unless the state meets
itsjustificatory burden, since the preamble provides evidence of the pur-
pose behind the statute as a whole.
It might be argued that the Webster declaration is simply an expres-
sion of the state's preference for childbirth. Since Casey explicitly allowed
a state to express its preference for childbirth, the per se rule should not
apply to such legislative declarations. But a declaration that life begins at
conception goes much further than a declaration that the state prefers
childbirth to abortion, because the implications of the former are that
abortions should be prohibited. Given the difficulty in differentiating a
purpose of expressing a preference for childbirth and a purpose of at-
tacking abortion directly, the state should be required to be explicit when
it is simply expressing its preference. Otherwise there is a risk that the
purpose prong of the undue burden standard will be rendered virtually
meaningless, a result which would be inconsistent with the decision to
introduce the purpose prong in Casey.149
146. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
147. Justices Blackmun and Stevens, as well as the lower court opinions in Webster,
found that the purpose of the preamble was to restrict access to abortions. See Webster, 492
U.S. at 539 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), at 562-63
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reproductive Health Servs. v.
Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 (8th Cir. 1988); Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster,
662 F. Supp. 407, 423 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
148. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.205.1 (Vernon Supp. 1994). This purpose of avoiding the
need for further enactment has been made more explicitly in legislative declarations by
other states. See, e.g., 1991 La. Acts 26 § 1 (Supp. 1992).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56 and 64. Since Casey held that
expressions of a preference for childbirth are not undue burdens, a declaration limited to
stating the state's preference for childbirth over abortion would not violate the per se rule.
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2. Surrogacy Test. - Another technique employed in dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis is the surrogacy test. If facially neutral legislation
appears to burden out-of-state interests unduly, the Court will inquire
into whether those interests have in-state representatives or "surrogates."
The absence of such surrogates triggers closer judicial review, because it
indicates that legislators will not face political pressure to minimize these
unequal burdens.' 50 Although the Court has not examined the adequacy
of in-state interests as representatives of out-of-state interests, it has only
found surrogates to exist when both parties are "affect[ed] alike."' 5 ' By
"affected alike" the Court appears to mean bearing similar financial bur-
dens.152 The surrogacy test was not raised for many years but has resur-
faced in some recent opinions.153 In a 1977 decision striking down re-
strictions on the length of trucks, the Court stated that the presumptive
validity of the state safety judgments is weakened by exemptions for local
businesses, since these exemptions "undermine the assumption that the
State's own political processes will act as a check on local regulations that
unduly burden interstate commerce." 54 The Court again raised the
point in 1981, in regard to a ban on nonreturnable plastic milk contain-
ers, arguing that "[t]he existence of major in-state interests adversely af-
fected by the Act is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse." 55
150. The surrogacy test is thus an instance of the process-based or representation-
reinforcing approach tojudicial review. See Eule, supra note 97, at 437-43; Mark Tushnet,
Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125, 141, 154. See generally
John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) (describing and justifying a
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review). The test rests on the interest-
group pluralism model of democracy which underlies many process theories of
adjudication, in that the test envisions individuals as exerting political pressure to serve
their own economic interests and pictures these interests as fully formed before individuals
interact in the political sphere. It is important to note, however, that the test is also
compatible with a "republican" conception of politics that emphasizes the endogenous
character of preferences and the way that these preferences are shaped through political
debate. In the republican approach, the surrogacy test serves as a means of protecting
against regulations enacted through raw political power. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences,
supra note 81, at 1694-95, 1705 nn.72-73.
151. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938).
152. See id. For example, the Court has not viewed in-state consumers as surrogates
for out-of-state interests. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 81, at 1705
nn.72-73.
153. The surrogacy test is usually traced to a 1938 opinion written by Justice Stone,
who argued that "when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally
upon those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some
interests within the state." Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 185 n.2.
154. Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978); see also Kassel v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-79 (1981) (the presence of affected in-
state interests ensures that the state's political processes will act as a check on unduly
burdensome legislation).
155. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981). Further,
concern about the lack of political representation led three Justices to dissent from the
Court's decision upholding California's requirement that foreign firms with domestic
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The Court has not specified the exact contours of the surrogacy test
in the dormant Commerce Clause area. The test's underlying concern
with ensuring that unrepresented interests receive fair treatment might
suggest it should be given a broad application. Accordingly, any action or
inaction that has a substantial effect on out-of-state interests would be
subject to dormant Commerce Clause review, or at least to a determina-
tion of the adequacy of representation by affected in-state interests.15 6
The Court, however, has never given the surrogacy test such a broad
sweep. Rather, it invokes the surrogacy test only in the limited circum-
stance where statutes are neutral on their face, ostensibly serve an impor-
tant state interest, yet appear to impose substantially greater burdens on
non-residents than on residents. The surrogacy test thus serves as a means
of determining if these burdens amount to discriminatory effects and
therefore require searching judicial scrutiny. I5 7
The triggering conditions of the surrogacy test are also present in
regard to abortion regulations aimed at minors.a58 While minors can ex-
press their interests through testifying and lobbying, they are unable to
exert political influence directly since they do not vote. They rely on
others, "surrogates," to represent their interests politically. In many con-
texts the parents of minors can play this surrogate role, and the Court has
recognized that parents usually will act to further the best interests of
their children.159 But there are strong reasons to question the effective-
ness of parents as political surrogates for their children in regard to abor-
tion legislation. The restrictions imposed on minors' access to abortion
subsidiaries must report their worldwide income. See Barclays Bank Plc. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2289 (1994).
156. See Regan, supra note 90, at 1162-64.
157. If the surrogacy test discovers discriminatory effects, then Hunt would seem to
require that the state bear the burden ofjustifying the legislation. See Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) ("When [discriminatory effects
are] found, the burden falls on the State tojustify" the legislation.). But the cases which
embody the surrogacy test do not hold that the state bears the justificatory burden if the
statute fails the test; rather, they claim only that such failure leads to lessjudicial deference.
See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., 434 U.S. at 443 n.18 (deference to state highway
regulations is based on the belief that such regulations will affect local interests as well as
out-of-state interests, so that the political process will protect against unduly burdensome
regulations).
158. The surrogacy test could be used to argue for careful scrutiny of all abortion
legislation on the grounds that women bear the burden of abortion regulations and
women are significantly underrepresented in state legislatures. See Estrich & Sullivan,
supra note 65, at 150-55. But this argument would deviate significantly from the use of the
surrogacy test in the dormant Commerce Clause arena, where the Court is concerned with
the absolute lack, not disproportionate lack, of direct political power. In addition, this
argument would require a detailed examination of theories of political process
breakdowns that is beyond the scope of this Note. Applying the surrogacy test to minors
avoids many of these difficulties, since the problem facing minors is not a barrier to
effective use of their political power but rather a lack of direct political power.
159. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("[P]ages of human
experience ... teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests.").
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are requirements of parental consent or notification. In this context, mi-
nors and their parents cannot be described as being "affected alike" by
the legislation. On the contrary, any parental gain of control over a mi-
nor's abortion decision entails a corresponding loss of control for the
minor.
The fact that abortion legislation leads to enhanced parental control
over minors' decisions does not by itself demonstrate that the interests of
minors are not being effectively represented. Many minors are not capa-
ble of mature decisionmaking and greatly benefit from having parental
input into their decisions. But it is important to note the ways in which a
minor's decision to have an abortion differs from other decisions she may
face. As the Court has argued, "many parents hold strong views on the
subject of abortion" that may not accord with the best interests of their
children. 160 It was this possibility that led the Court to require judicial
bypass procedures, a requirement the Court has not imposed in other
areas of parent-child relations. 1 1 The decision to have an abortion is
different from other choices a minor may face because it cannot be post-
poned until the minor comes of age. 162 The abortion decision also dif-
fers from other choices because of its significance; a denial of the minor's
choice to have an abortion may have exceptionally "grave and indelible"
consequences on her life. 163 These consequences include not only the
physical and emotional effects of unwanted childbearing, but also the
permanent social and economic costs of teen pregnancy.'64 Lastly, pa-
rental control of abortion decisions can be particularly harmful for the
children of abusive parents, since notification of a daughter's pregnancy
is likely to spark abuse. 165
160. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979); see also Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti I), 428 U.S. 132, 141 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75
(1975). In Minnesota, statistics compiled by the juvenile court indicated that in 68 out of
258, or 26 percent, of judicial bypass hearings, parental opposition to abortion was the
reason given for seeking the bypass. SeeJoint Appendix at 380-81, Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309).
161. See supra text Accompanying note 19. For discussions of the Court's approach to
children's rights, and the general acceptance of parental control, see Susan G. Mezey,
Constitutional Adjudication of Children's Rights Claims in the United States Supreme
Court 1953-92, 27 Fam. L.Q. 307, 308-13 (1993).
162. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642.
163. Id.
164. See id. For example, "one in four teenage mothers drops out of high school and
only one in fifty graduates college." Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Population Options
et al. at 10, Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 417 (Nos. 88-1125, 22-1309). For additional discussions of
the effects of teenage pregnancy, see NARAL, Promoting Reproductive Choices: A New
Approach to Reproductive Health 12 (1994) [hereinafter NARAL, Promoting
Reproductive Choices]; Jeff Grogger & Stephen Bronars, The Socioeconomic
Consequences of Teenage Childbearing, 25 Fain. Plan. Persp. 156, 160-61 (1993); Laurie
S. Zabin et al., When Urban Adolescents Choose Abortion, 21 Fain. Plan. Persp. 248,
250-54 (1989).
165. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 451 n.36.
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Judicial bypass procedures can be seen as an attempt to ensure surro-
gate representation of the minor's interests;166 if the judge determines an
abortion is in the minor's best interests, or that the minor is mature
enough to decide for herself, the judge will represent the minor's inter-
ests by ordering that the minor need not fulfill consent or notification
requirements. 67 The problem with this argument is that it conflates
political representation of minors' interests with judicial representation.
Judicial representation through a bypass procedure comes only after re-
strictions on minors have been enacted and therefore such representa-
tion is unable to voice minors' interests in avoiding onerous require-
ments, for instance a two-parent notification or consent requirement. 68
Relying on judicial representation of minors' interests is particularly
problematic when restrictions such as clear and convincing proof require-
ments are imposed on judicial bypass procedures.' 69
The absence of surrogates for minors in the political process sug-
gests, on the surrogacy rationale, that there is a greater risk that restric-
tions on minors will be unduly burdensome. As a result, the Court
should subject such restrictions to a rigorous review more akin to inter-
mediate or strict scrutiny. The Court should examine, in particular, the
benefits achieved by minors' restrictions and ensure that in practice mi-
nors possess effective access to a judicial bypass. This conclusion differs
dramatically from the Court's current approach to the restrictions. Far
from subjecting these restrictions to heightened scrutiny, the Court pro-
vides less exacting review than it applies in regard to other abortion re-
strictions. 170 The Court has based its lower standard of review on the
"immaturity, inexperience and lack ofjudgment" of minors, and the ben-
efits to minors of parental involvement in most cases.' 71 Most recently
166. Studies of the effect of parental consent and notification requirements provide
support for this conclusion. These studies indicate that most judicial bypass requests are
granted. See id. at 477 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner,
Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in Adolescent Abortion 1, 25-28 (Gary B.
Melton ed., 1986). However, there is also anecdotal evidence of judicial hostility to
abortion. See, e.g., Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., supra note 58,
at 27 (reporting Michigan judge's statement that he would only approve an abortion on a
judicial bypass "in cases of incest or the rape of a White girl by a Black man").
167. One point that deserves special note is the assumption that all minors'
restrictions contain a bypass procedure. Although in general the Court has required such
procedures, it has upheld a parental notification statute that did not have such a
procedure where the statute was applied to an immature, unemancipated minor. See H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 642-48. The Court has
explicitly left open the question of whether notification statutes require bypass procedures.
See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron II), 497 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1990).
168. For an example of a statute with such a requirement, see Hodgson, 497 U.S. at
424-26 (requiring notification of both parents without a judicial bypass procedure).
169. See Akron II, 497 U.S. at 514-17 (requiring a complicated pleading process and
clear and convincing proof of maturity, abuse, or best interests for judicial bypass).
170. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (joint opinion); Akron II,
497 U.S. at 510-11; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444-45; Matheson, 450 U.S. at 413.
171. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444-45 & n.31.
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the Court argued that "[i]t is both rational and fair.., to conclude that,
in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified
minor advice that is compassionate and mature." 172 The empirical basis
of these claims is debatable; for example, studies indicate that compelling
parental consultation does not significantly increase parental involve-
ment.173 In addition, these arguments do not address the surrogacy test's
concern with legislative abuse and are much less powerful in regard to
those restrictions requiring consent or notification of both parents or
those imposing onerous bypass procedures. Parental support can be
given by one parent, and the Court has held that an adequate bypass
procedure is essential to protecting the best interests of minors. Thus at
a minimum, the rigorous review imposed as a result of the surrogacy test
would call these two types of restrictions on minors into question.
3. Cumulative Effects. - A third technique that the Court employs
under its dormant Commerce Clause analysis is a cumulative effects prin-
ciple. Under this principle, the Court takes all of the effects of the legisla-
tion into account in calculating the burden imposed, even those effects
that the state did not intend or cannot control. The rationale behind the
cumulative effects principle is that the true scope and impact of a regula-
tion cannot be correctly measured unless the effects of a regulation are
examined as a whole. A similar principle is found in the Court's ap-
proach to congressional power under the Commerce Clause.174
There are two ways of applying the cumulative effects principle
under the dormant Commerce Clause. One inquiry looks at all of the
effects of a statute, including unintended or indirect effects, to determine
whether a statute is reasonable or overly burdensome. For example, the
Court invalidated a state statute taxing mail order sales, arguing that al-
lowing such taxation might indirectly deter investment by mail order
firms. 175 In a similar inquiry into aggregate effects, the Court held that a
limit on the length of trains would not yield any safety benefits, because
shorter trains meant more train trips.' 76 The second approach places
legislation into a national context. The Court takes into account the ef-
fects one state's regulations have in other states in assessing whether the
regulations are unduly burdensome. Hence it included the fact that
Iowa's restriction of truck lengths increased accidents in neighboring
172. Akron II, 497 U.S. at 520.
173. A comparison of Minnesota, which requires consultation, and Wisconsin, which
does not, showed a statistically indistinguishable percentage of minor women voluntarily
consulted a parent (65.3 percent versus 62.1 percent). See Brief of Amici Curiae Center
for Population Options, supra note 164, at 18 n.70.
174. In this context, the principle requires that the Court calculate the interstate
effect of all instances of the activity in the nation. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
125-28 (1942).
175. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel Heitkamp, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1915 (1992).
176. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945); see
also Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 674-75, 675 n.17 (1981).
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states in its calculation of the safety benefits of the limits. 177 In tax cases
the Court determines whether a state's apportionment formula is bur-
densome by calculating the effect on a company if the formula were ap-
plied by all states. 178 Finally, the Court measures the burden imposed by
one state's legislation in comparison to the regulatory policies of other
states. For example, Illinois' requirement of contour mudguards was
struck down for unduly burdening commerce because most states al-
lowed-and one state required-straight mudguards. 179 This inquiry
into cumulative effects often accompanies the Court's second-tier balanc-
ing of the benefits and burdens of legislation, but nonetheless represents
a distinct stage in the analysis. The Court first applies the cumulative
effects principle to calculate what the benefits and burdens of the legisla-
tion are and then employs balancing to determine whether the legislation
is justified.'80
The cumulative effects principle is equally applicable to abortion
regulations.18l As in the case of legislation affecting interstate com-
merce, the Court's concern is to ensure that abortion regulations are not
too burdensome in practice. In addition, the full impact of an abortion
regulation cannot be determined unless all its effects are calculated.
There is also support for a cumulative effects principle in the Casey joint
opinion itself, which emphasized that women must retain the "right to
make the ultimate decision" concerning abortion.' 8 2 This focus on ulti-
mate control would seem to require an examination of cumulative ef-
fects. Further, the Casey opinion emphasized the need to examine regu-
177. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 674-75 & n.18, 677-78.
178. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983)
(describing the "internal consistency" requirement that a formula must not result in
taxation of more than 100 percent of the unitary business' income if applied in every
jurisdiction); see also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984) (applying
internal consistency test of Container Corp.). The Court does not compare the tax measures
in effect in different states. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 242 (1987).
179. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 526-27 (1959); see also Kassel,
450 U.S. at 671 (Iowa truck length limit "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern
and Western States"); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 381-82 (1946) ("cumulative
effects" make racial separation on public carriers impracticable).
180. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 526-28 (cumulative effect of regulation as part of "rather
massive showing of burden oh interstate commerce" from the regulation); Southern Pac.,
325 U.S. at 775-76 (cumulative calculation used to determine "total [safety] effect" of
regulation, which is then weighed against burden on interstate commerce).
181. On the need to calculate the cumulative effects of abortion regulations, see Ohio
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron II), 497 U.S. 502, 527 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The
Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 83, 99-103 (1989); Estrich & Sullivan, supra
note 65, at 137.
182. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821 (1992) (joint opinion).
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lations in light of their actual effects, and explicitly required the inclusion
of "incidental" effects in undue burden determinations.18 3
The inquiry into indirect and unintended effects can be extrapolated
to the abortion context without alteration from its dormant Commerce
Clause form. The Court would determine whether the actual effects of a
regulation, even if unintended or indirect, created an undue burden.
The examination of the husband notification requirement in Casey repre-
sents such an analysis. The Court struck down the requirement because
it held that the actual, albeit unintended, effect would be to deny access
to abortion for many women.18 4 In addition, the Court would examine
whether the indirect or unintended effects of an abortion regulation call
the reasonableness of the regulation into question. Such an inquiry
would be particularly useful in examining statutes that require the con-
sent or notification of both parents before a minor can obtain an abor-
tion.18 5 A two-parent notification and consent requirement often under-
cuts family structure and communication; it forces divorced parents to
apply for a judicial bypass to avoid contacting noncustodial spouses, and
minors who might have consulted one parent often will not do so if they
must apply for judicial bypass in any case.186
Although such an inquiry into the actual effects of a regulation
would be consistent with the theoretical framework of the undue burden
standard, it would deviate from the application of the standard to most of
the provisions at issue in Casey. The Casey opinion held that all abortion
regulations should at a minimum be subjected to rationality review, but
applied the weak rationality review associated with economic due process,
which does not consider the actual effects of regulations.' 8 7 A rationality
review that examines the actual effects of legislation would be more akin
to the rationality-with-bite approach the Court has occasionally used
where legislation affects liberty interests not amounting to fundamental
rights or particular groups which are not specially protected under equal
protection analysis.' 88 Rationality-with-bite examines whether the regula-
183. See id. at 2819, 2825. Justice Souter's recent decision holding open the
possibility of an as applied challenge to Pennsylvania's abortion regulations provides
further evidence of the Court's focus on actual effects. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
114 S. CLt. 909, 910 n.3 (1994) (Souter, J., denying stay of mandate).
184. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31 (majority opinion).
185. The Court used an examination of unintended and indirect effects in striking
down a two-parent notification statute which lacked a bypass. See Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417, 450-52 (1990).
186. See id. at 438, 440, 450-51.
187. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824-25 (joint opinion) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), which is an instance of the application of weak rationality review
to economic regulations).
188. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-43 (1985) (mentally
retarded); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (children of illegal aliens); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (access to contraception for unmarried individuals).
For discussion and critical assessment of the rationality-with-bite approach, see Tribe, supra
note 48, § 16-3 at 1443-46; Fallon, supra note 47, at 312-27; Gerald Gunther, The
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tion in fact achieves its stated purpose and also reviews the legitimacy of
this purpose.'8 9 Several arguments support a shift to employing the ra-
tionality-with-bite approach and examining actual effects. Such an ap-
proach fits Casey's concern with gauging the effects an abortion regula-
tion has in practice. It would also conform with the Court's analysis of
other reproductive rights and family autonomy.190 In addition, although
rationality-with-bite provides more searching review of regulations, it usu-
ally does not involve balancing the burdens and benefits of regulations or
examining alternative legislation. 191
The second form of the cumulative effects principle, where the
Court places legislation in a national context, must be adapted to apply to
abortion regulations. The interstate effects of abortion regulations may
be relevant but are not central to an examination of their constitutional-
ity under the undue burden standard. 192 But the rationale behind in-
quiring into the interstate effects in the dormant Commerce Clause con-
text is to determine the total impact of a regulation on the affected
parties. Similarly, in order to determine the total impact of an abortion
regulation, the Court must assess the impact of the regulation with refer-
ence to other abortion regulations enacted by the state. This version of
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
189. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-50; Tribe, supra note 48, § 16-3 at 1443-46.
190. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,498-99 (1977) (personal choice
in matters of family living arrangements); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443 (access to
contraceptives).
191. The Court has been notably unclear about the characteristics of its rationality-
with-bite approach, and often has maintained that it is applying regular rationality review.
See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50. It cannot be stated definitively, therefore, that the Court
does not engage in balancing or examine alternatives under the rationality-with-bite
approach. In some circumstances, such as mental patients' interests in freedom from
restraint or the education of children of illegal aliens, the Court has balanced the benefits
and burdens of regulations. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-24 (1982); Plyler,
457 U.S. at 218-24; Aleinikoff, supra note 51, at 969-72. But the Court has employed
language associated with intermediate scrutiny in these cases. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at
221-24 (emphasizing the importance of access to education and requiring a substantial
rather than legitimate state goal). Where the Court simply uses the language of rationality
review, it does not engage in balancing. In addition, although under rationality-with-bite
the Court may suggest alternative ways of phrasing a classification, this examination of
alternatives is used to question the legitimacy of a: stated purpose and not as part of a
narrow. tailoring requirement. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
192. Restrictive abortion regulations may create undue burdens in other states. For
example they may result in much heavier use of out-of-state abortion providers and thus
lead to increased delay in access to abortion in neighboring states. See Brief of Amici
Curiae the City of New York et al., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(Nos. 91-744, 91-902). Moreover, the interstate dimension of abortion regulations may be
relevant in assessing the constitutionality of some regulations, for example where a state
imposed residency requirements for women seeking abortions within its boundaries. See
Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the
Right to Die, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 873 (1993). These interstate issues raised by abortion
regulations are beyond the scope of this Note.
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the cumulative effects principle would require that in reviewing a chal-
lenged statute the Court determine the effects of the statute as a whole,
not just of each separate provision. In addition, the Court would need to
determine the impact of the challenged statute in combination with
other already existing restrictions on abortion.
This use of the cumulative effects principle is again not consistent
with the application of the undue burden inquiry in Casey. In assessing
whether Pennsylvania's abortion regulations created an undue burden
the joint opinion analyzed each provision separately. However, the opin-
ion provided no justification for this approach. Moreover, examining the
effect of a challenged statute as a whole, and in relation to existing regu-
lations, is consistent with the undue burden standard's underlying con-
cern with ensuring that a regulation does not create a substantial obstacle
barring access to abortion, even incidentally. Provisions that individually
do not impose undue burdens may combine to creaie such a substantial
obstacle.
A comparison of the dormant Commerce Clause two-tiered inquiry
and the Casey undue burden standard demonstrates how three methods
used in the dormant Commerce Clause context could be incorporated
into the undue burden standard. The per se rule of facial invalidity
would lead the Court to strike down regulations that facially impose sub-
stantial burdens on pre-viability abortions. The surrogacy test would re-
quire judges to scrutinize restrictions on minors more carefully to ensure
that such restrictions serve the interests of minors. Lastly, the cumulative
effects principle would require that judges examine the actual effects of
abortion regulation, as well as calculate the total effect of all of the regu-
lation's provisions and of the regulation in conjunction with other restric-
tions on abortion.
III. FiRsT AMENDMENT MODELS
Two First Amendment approaches, the content-neutral, traditional
forum analysis applied to speech and the endorsement test of the Estab-
lishment Clause, also involve fact-sensitive inquiries into the purpose and
effect of a regulation. A comparison of the abortion undue burden stan-
dard with these approaches suggests several additional techniques that
could be used to construct a more systematic method for determining
when undue burdens exist. Content-neutral, traditional forum analysis
justifies an explicit focus on the impact of regulations on poor women,
while the endorsement test offers a procedure for identifying the purpose
of a regulation and an acknowledgement of the coercive power of sym-
bolic effects. This comparison again demonstrates that the abortion un-
due burden standard is virtually unique in its lack of protection against
unnecessary but not undue burdens.
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A. Content-Neutra, Traditional Forum Analysis and the Undue Burden
Standard
1. A Comparison of Content-Neutral, Traditional Forum Analysis and the
Abortion Undue Burden Standard. - Content-neutral, traditional forum
analysis is used to determine the constitutionality of statutes that regulate
the time, place, and manner of speech. The Court applies a different
level of review to such statutes depending on where the speech occurs.' 9 3
The standard of review is strongest for speech occurring in "quintessen-
tial public forums," which "by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate."' 94 In such contexts, the Court
distinguishes between content-neutral and content-based regulations.
Content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate review and must
be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication." 195 Content-based
regulations, on the other hand, receive strict scrutiny; they must be neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest. 9 6 Regulations limiting speech
in contexts the Court has identified as "non-public" or "limited" public
forums need only be reasonable in light of the purposes of the property
and not represent attempts to suppress a particular viewpoint. 197
The Court's approach to content-neutral regulations of speech in a
traditional forum is useful for developing the abortion undue burden
standard.' 9 8 The content-neutral, traditional forum analysis is notably
similar to the undue burden standard in at least three significant re-
spects. Both are fact-sensitive standards that hinge on a case-by-case ex-
amination of the record. The fact-sensitivity of the content-neutral, tradi-
tional forum analysis results from the Court's concern with the "actual,
physical characteristics and uses of the property," as demonstrated in its
193. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) (stating that "the extent to which the Government can control access depends on
the nature of the relevant forum"); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-46 (1983) (delineating separate categories of forum which correspond to varying
levels of free speech protection).
194. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
195. Id.
196. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
197. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46, 49. Limited public forums are places
that the government has opened as areas of expressive activity, while non-public forums are
public properties that have not been so opened. See id. at 45-46. In recent cases,
however, the Court essentially has collapsed the limited public forum into a non-public
forum by holding that the contours of a limited public forum are set by the government's
intent when it opened up the property. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804-06; see also Robert
C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public
Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1713, 1745-58 (1987).
198. The non-public forum inquiry is not comparable because rationality review is not
applied to abortion regulations until the Court has determined that the regulations do not
impose an undue burden. Content-based, traditional forum analysis also is inapplicable
because abortion regulations need not serve a compelling government interest.
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detailed examination of the property at issue.1 9 9 Additionally, both stan-
dards contain purpose and effect prongs and hold that a regulation may
be struck down if it violates either prong. In the abortion context, a regu-
lation cannot have the purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle
to access to pre-viability abortions. 20 0 In content-neutral, traditional fo-
rum analysis the purpose prong is represented by the content-neutral and
significant government interest provisos, and the effects prong by the nar-
row tailoring and alternative channels requirements.
Most importantly, content-neutral, traditional forum analysis shares
the undue burden standard's concern for ensuring that regulations do
not create substantial obstacles to the exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected right. In the former analysis, this concern is captured by the in-
quiry into whether the regulation preserves "ample alternative channels"
for speech. Since the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis states
that a regulation must be struck down if sufficient alternatives do not
exist, it appears to define certain obstacles as unconstitutional regardless
of resulting benefits. 20 '
Yet there are also three notable differences between the two stan-
dards that limit the extent to which content-neutral, traditional forum
analysis can supply a methodology for the undue burden standard. A
regulation must be even-handed for content-neutral, traditional forum
analysis to apply; any regulation that distinguishes according to subject
matter or viewpoint is judged on the content-based standard. In contrast,
states are explicitly allowed to express their preference for childbirth in
abortion regulations. This requirement of content-neutrality does not
make a comparison to the undue burden standard inappropriate. For
although abortion regulations need not be neutral, they cannot seek to
create substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking to obtain a
pre-viability abortion. Therefore, both standards deem certain purposes
illegitimate. The absence of a neutrality requirement under the abortion
undue burden standard does make the search for illegitimate purpose
more difficult in the abortion context than in the free speech area, since
199. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2716
(1992) (KennedyJ, concurring); see also Tribe, supra note 48, § 12-2 at 792-94, § 12-24
at 990-91. For particularly striking examples of this detailed examination, compare the
discussion of sidewalks in Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-29 (plurality opinion) (holding that
post office sidewalk is not a public forum) with that in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,
178-80 (1983) (holding that sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court is a public forum).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
201. Although on its face the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis appears to
require that a regulation be struck down when alternatives do not exist, in practice the
Court has been willing to uphold some such regulations if the type of expression at issue is
considered to be of "lower value." See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991)
(availability of alternative channels not considered in review of ban on public nudity).
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a purpose of expressing a preference for childbirth may be hard to distin-
guish from a purpose of preventing abortions.20 2
The second and third differences are that content-neutral, tradi-
tional forum analysis requires a significant government interest while the
undue burden standard demands only a legitimate and reasonable gov-
ernment interest, and further that the former involves balancing whereas
the latter does not.20 3 The absence of significant interest and balancing
requirements in the undue burden standard underscores again the stan-
dard's lack of protection against unnecessary but not undue burdens and
unjustified burdens on abortion access. The significant interest require-
ment in practice serves as a shield against unnecessary burdens because it
forces the government to demonstrate that the regulation actually ad-
vances a worthwhile interest.20 4 Under content-neutral, traditional fo-
rum analysis balancing is often achieved through the narrow tailoring re-
quirement, which is akin to the search for non-discriminatory alternatives
under the dormant Commerce Clause. As part of the content-neutral,
traditional forum standard, narrow tailoring does not necessitate employ-
ing the least restrictive means available; rather, a regulation is considered
narrowly tailored provided it does not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary.20 5 In several recent cases the Court has used the effec-
tiveness of the current regulation as the baseline against which "neces-
sary" is defined and has struck down statutes for violating the narrow tai-
loring requirement only where an alternative would accomplish the
state's purposes equally effectively. 20 6 Nevertheless, even this weak inter-
pretation of narrow tailoring offers greater protection against unneces-
sary burdens than is provided under the Casey undue burden standard.
Under Casey, if a regulation does not impose an undue burden on pre-
202. This difference between the abortion undue burden standard and traditional
forum analysis parallels a difference between the undue burden standard and dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, in that the latter embodies a neutrality requirement in its
insistence on even-handed regulations. See supra text accompanying note 104.
203. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Sullivan, Supreme Court, supra
note 47, at 61; supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
204. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1983); Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-39 (1980); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 52 & n.27 (1987). It should be noted that the Court has
employed the content-neutral, traditional forum standard very deferentially in some cases,
for example by not inquiring into whether the government's interest is in fact significant.
See id. at 48-54. This deference is closely connected to the Court's recent restriction of
the scope of traditional public forums. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. In
addition, the Court has rarely held that an asserted government interest is not significant,
but instead has used the significant interest requirement to force more narrow tailoring.
See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2713-14 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Grace, 461 U.S. at 182.
205. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799-800 (1989); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 297 (1984).
206. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 801-02; United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985); Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-99.
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viability abortions the court only applies a very weak version of rationality
review.207 As a result, the existence of a less burdensome, equally effec-
tive alternative is irrelevant to determining the constitutionality of an
abortion regulation.208
2. The Alternative Means Inquiry and the Impact of Regulations on the
Poor. - This comparison has indicated that the abortion undue burden
standard and the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis are both fact-
sensitive approaches that contain purpose and effect prongs and inquire
into the extent of the burden imposed by regulations. Since the signifi-
cant interest and narrow tailoring requirements are not found in the un-
due burden standard, the techniques employed to apply these require-
ments cannot be extrapolated to the abortion context.209 The
techniques used to establish whether ample alternative channels exist,
however, are useful in determining whether an undue burden is created.
While the Court has never developed a specific technique for gauging the
adequacy of alternative channels, it has traditionally displayed a particu-
lar concern with the impact a regulation would have on people with few
resources-or, in the words of an early opinion, with the impact on "the
poorly financed causes of little people."210 A similar concern is found in
regard to the effect voting regulations will have on free expression. 211
'Recent traditional forum cases do not express as strong a concern with
the impact of regulations on people with few resources.212 These cases,
207. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824-25 (1992) (joint
opinion); supra notes 48 and 187 and accompanying text.
208. For a similar conclusion reached from comparing the abortion undue burden
standard with the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see supra text accompanying notes
106-107.
209. It should be mentioned, however, that the cumulative effects principle is used in
content-neutral, traditional forum analysis as a means of determining whether a significant
government interest exists. In this context, the principle holds that the government
should look at the benefits of a regulation in general, rather than in relation to one group.
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 801; Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-97; Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes
181-192 for a discussion of the applicability of the cumulative effects principle in the
abortion context.
210. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
211. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983) (striking down early
filing requirement for independent candidates); Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 98 (1982) (holding that a state cannot compel a party to make
disclosures that will subject its members to threats, harassment, or reprisals). A similar
concern is raised in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), but primarily in regard to the
right to vote and not free expression. See id. at 143-45; see also Stone, supra note 204, at
84-86 (discussing approaches used where content-neutral restriction has a disparate
impact on different groups).
212. The Court has upheld bans on sleeping in parks, on signs attached to utility
poles, and on placing unstamped material in private mailboxes, all of which impacted
particularly strongly on groups with few resources. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 313 n.14
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (parks); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
819-20 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (utility poles); United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 143-44 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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however, appear to reflect an attempt by the Court to narrow the scope of
the traditional public forum, not a lack of interest in the effects of regula-
tions on the poor.2 13
In addition, even if the Court is less concerned with the effect on
groups with few resources, the belief that special attention should be
given to the effect of regulations on the poor continues to be voiced. In a
1992 case striking down a ban on leafletting in airports, Justice Kennedy
wrote:
The effect of a rule of law distinguishing between sales and dis-
tribution would be to close the marketplace of ideas to less afflu-
ent organizations and speakers, leaving speech as the preserve
of those who are able to fund themselves. One of the primary
purposes of the public forum is to provide persons who lack ac-
cess to more sophisticated media the opportunity to speak. A
prohibition on sales forecloses that opportunity for the very per-
sons who need it most.2 14
Thus it appears that the alternative channels inquiry continues to involve
a focus on the impact of a regulation on people with few resources.
A similar focus should characterize the inquiry into undue burdens
in the abortion context.215 One of the key factors affecting the availabil-
ity of abortion is the cost of the procedure. A focus on the impact regula-
tions have on poor women is vital because only twelve states allow public
funding for abortion in most instances. 216 Focusing on the impact on
poor women is also important because poor women have significantly
higher rates of unintended pregnancies, in part because they are more
likely to experience contraceptive failure. 21
7
(mailboxes). In upholding the sign ban justice Stevens argued that "[alIthough the Court
has shown special solicitude for forms of expression that are much less expensive than
feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large section of the citizenry,... this
solicitude has practical boundaries." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812 n.30 (citations
omitted).
213. See Taxpayers for incent, 466 U.S. at 814 (utility poles are not traditional public
forums); Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 128 (letterboxes are not public forums). But see Clark,
468 U.S. at 293 (applying traditional public forum analysis to parks).
214. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2723
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215. For similar suggestions that abortion regulations should be assessed in terms of
their effect on poor women, see Dellinger & Sperling, supra note 181, at 102-03; Estrich &
Sullivan, supra note 65, at 134-35, 154.
216. See NARAL, Who Decides? A State-by-State Review of Abortion Rights 145
(1993) [hereinafter NARAL, Who Decides?]. These numbers may increase in light of the
recent congressional amendment providing Medicaid funding for abortions where the
pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. See 1994 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 103-112,
§ 510, 107 Stat. 1113 (1993). The Clinton Administration interpreted this statute as
requiring that all states provide such funding, and this interpretation has been upheld by
several courts. See, e.g., Little Rock Planning Serv. v. Dalton, No. LR-C-93-803, 1994 WL
386796 (E.D. Ark. July 25, 1994).
217. See Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., supra
note 58, at 17-18.
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Such a focus accords with the undue burden standard as enunciated
in Casey, but not with the application of the standard to the Pennsylvania
regulations. The Casey joint opinion explicitly acknowledged the rele-
vance of an investigation into the expense caused by a regulation, noting
that "at some point increased cost could become a substantial obsta-
cle."21 8 The opinion also insisted that regulations should be judged by
their impact on women for whom they are a restriction. 219 These com-
ments would suggest that a review of abortion regulations should contain
an examination of the effect of cost increases caused by the regulations
on poor women, since such increases are most likely to be a restriction
for poor women. But the joint opinion failed to provide any focused
analysis of the Pennsylvania regulations on poor women. The opinion
upheld the recordkeeping requirements, maintaining that "[a] t most they
might increase the cost of abortions by a slight amount,"220 without indi-
cating whether this cost was also slight for women with few resources.
Indeed, the opinion appeared to discount the prohibitive effect that cost
increases might have on some women. For example, it distinguished the
husband notification requirement from the other restrictions, on the
grounds that this requirement "does not merely make abortions a little
more.., expensive to obtain; for many women, it will impose a substan-
tial obstacle."221
Explicitly adapting the perspective of poor women as the standpoint
from which costs are evaluated would ensure that a focus on the effect of
abortion regulations on women with few resources is included in the un-
due burden standard. The Court would determine whether increased
costs are slight or substantial explicitly from this perspective. If the Court
found that a regulation would result in a significant increase in the cost
of an abortion, the regulation would be struck down for imposing an un-
due burden. Thus, there would be no need for any additional inquiry
into whether the increase actually operated as a substantial obstacle to
abortion access.222 It would be presumed that a significant increase in
the cost of abortion was a substantial obstacle to abortion access for poor
women.
A focus on the impact of abortion regulations on poor women would
be particularly useful in challenging hospitalization requirements, man-
dated tests to determine fetal size or viability, and waiting periods. Such
hospitalization and testing requirements can double the cost of abor-
218. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992) (joint opinion).
219. See id. at 2829 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 2833 (joint opinion).
221. Id. at 2829 (majority opinion).
222. The Casy opinion engaged in this second investigation in its review of waiting
periods. See id. at 2825-26 (joint opinion) (finding that a waiting period imposes a
particular burden on poor and rural women cannot be equated with finding that it is a
substantial obstacle).
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tions.2 28 Waiting periods dramatically increase costs by forcing women
who must travel to reach an abortion provider either to make two trips or
to stay overnight near the provider. They also increase costs by requiring
women to lose an additional day of work or to pay twice for childcare. 224
Data on the effect of a twenty-four hour waiting period in Mississippi
show that during the first six months of the waiting period's implementa-
tion there has been an eleven to thirteen percent decline in the overall
number of abortions obtained, and a twenty-nine percent decline among
women with less than twelve years of education. 225
In addition, this focus could potentially provide a basis on which to
challenge the current distinction between abortion regulations and abor-
tion funding.22 6 The Court has long held that the government may re-
fuse to pay for abortions under Medicaid, even if they are medically nec-
essary and even if the government provides coverage for childbirth. In
Webster, the Court upheld a ban on the use of public hospitals and em-
ployees for elective abortions. 227 The Court's acceptance of such prohibi-
tions rests on the belief that the government is not responsible for the
condition of poverty which makes abortion services less accessible to
some women absent subsidization.228 In contrast, when the government
regulates abortion it creates obstacles to abortion access that would not
have existed absent the government's actions. The Court has also argued
that since a denial of funding does not create unconstitutional obstacles,
the government is entitled to use its resources to foster its preference for
childbirth.2 29
Arguably, these rationales become less convincing under the undue
burden standard, particularly if the undue burden standard is held to
223. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S. 416,
434-35 (1983); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 514 (1989)
(testing requirement may add $150-$200 to the cost of an abortion).
224. See discussion of Pennsylvania's waiting period, infra notes 290-92 and
accompanying text.
225. See Record at 129-31, Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Engler, No. 94-40089
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (evidence reported by Stanley K. Henshaw, Deputy Director of Research
at the Alan Guttmacher Institute). Additional evidence gathered by the Alan Guttmacher
Institute indicates that this decline is not attributable to women changing their minds
about obtaining an abortion during the waiting period. See id. at 134.
226. A discussion of the general principles underlying the funding-regulation or
benefits-burdens divide is beyond the scope of this Note. As a result, the following
discussion simply focuses on the possibility of a change in the approach to abortion
funding. For more general discussion of the topic, see Tribe, supra note 48, § 11-5 at
781-84; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989)
[hereinafter Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions].
227. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-511 (plurality opinion).
228. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (government need not fund even
medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (government need not
fund therapeutic abortions even if it funds childbirth).
229. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 511 (citing Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977));
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. The Court's approach to the issue of abortion funding conforms to
its analysis of conditions attached to welfare funding in general.
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require a careful examination of the effects of abortion on poor women.
The strict categorical divide between funding and regulation is inconsis-
tent with the Court's move away from formal rules in the abortion
arena.230 As evidenced by its adoption of the undue burden standard,
the Court is now willing to accept some regulatory burdens on abortion
access and has eschewed the clear structure of strict scrutiny analysis for a
more malleable measuring approach. 231 Moreover, according to Casey a
legitimate purpose cannot vindicate regulations that impose substantial
obstacles to access to abortion. The fact that the government's purpose
in denying funding is to express and foster its preference for childbirth
would be irrelevant if the funding denial imposed such obstacles. On this
interpretation of the abortion undue burden standard, the central issue
becomes whether these prohibitions create substantial obstacles to abor-
tion access in practice.
Once attention is focused on the actual effects of bans on the use of
public funding and public facilities for abortion, their burdensome char-
acter becomes more apparent. The actual effect of funding denials and
new financial burdens caused by abortion regulations is identical: imped-
ing a poor woman's access to abortion. Studies have indicated that the
cutoff in Medicaid abortion funding may have resulted in a twenty per-
cent decline in the number of Medicaid eligible women obtaining abor-
tions and in delays averaging two to three weeks for some women.23 2 Fur-
ther, there are several arguments that can be made as to why these bans
impose burdens beyond those that poor women would face absent any
government funding scheme, simply as a result of their poverty. For ex-
ample, the availability of funds to cover the expenses of pregnancy and
childbirth, but not for abortion, may exert coercive pressure on poor wo-
men to choose childbirth. 23 3 Public hospitals and clinics may represent
the only health facilities in many areas.234 In addition, funding for other
family planning services may have led women to establish relationships
230. For a discussion of Casey as representing a move away from formal rules, see
Sullivan, Supreme Court, supra note 47, at 34. Sullivan has argued elsewhere that a move
away from a categorical approach might lead to reconsideration of some funding
decisions. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization
and Balancing, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 312-17 (1992); Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, supra note 226, at 1500-05.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
232. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion
Services for the Poor, 16 Fam. Plan. Persp. 170, 180 (1984) (delays averaging two to three
weeks); James Trussell et al., The Impact of Restricting Medicaid Financing for Abortion,
12 Fam. Plan. Persp. 120, 129-30 (1980) (approximately one-fifth of pregnant, Medicaid-
eligible women have unwanted children as a result of the Medicaid cutoff).
233. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 330, 333-34 (1980) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
234. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass'n of Public Hosp. at 7-8, Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605); see also Rachel B. Gold,
Alan Guttmacher Institute, Abortion and Women's Health: A Turning Point for America?
54 (1990). Moreover, private hospitals may not admit uninsured women who are at risk of
complications even when these women have the funds necessary to cover the abortion
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with physicians at public clinics.235 Prohibitions on the use of public fa-
cilities or public employees for abortions are particularly burdensome in
those states that require hospitalization for second trimester abortions,23 6
or where the state has defined public facilities and employees so broadly
as to apply to institutions with minimal public connections. 237
The Court's funding-regulation dichotomy in regard to abortion has
been criticized as inconsistent with the Court's jurisprudence regarding
conditions attached to government funding, and with the strict scrutiny
applied to abortion regulations under Roe.238 Although the undue bur-
den standard also leads to a challenge to this dichotomy, the frequent
distinction between expressions of legislative preference and undue bur-
dens in the Casey opinion indicates strongly that the Court will be unwill-
ing to reconsider its abortion funding decisions.239
This examination of the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis
of the First Amendment suggests that the Court should adopt the per-
spective of women with few resources in calculating the impact of an
abortion regulation. If, using this perspective, the Court determines that
a regulation substantially or even significantly increases the cost of an
abortion, the regulation should be struck down as imposing an undue
burden.
procedure, for fear that these women will not be able to pay for additional services. See
Brief of National Ass'n of Public Hosps., supra, at 8-9.
235. See Brief of National Ass'n of Public Hosp., supra note 234, at 4-6; Brief of
Amicus Curiae the National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Ass'n at 13-14,
Webster (No. 88-605).
236. The Court sustained second-trimester hospitalization requirements in Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
237. An example of such minimal connection is found in the ban on the use of public
facilities at issue in Webster, which included any institution that leased land from the state
or a state subdivision in the definition of public facility. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 540 n.1
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. For examples of these criticisms, see Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court
Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae,
32 Stan. L. Rev. 1113 (1980) (abortion funding doctrine inconsistent with Roe); Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 226, at 1440 (abortion funding doctrine
inconsistent with other unconstitutional conditions cases); Laurence H. Tribe, The
Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma
of Dependence, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 330 (1985) (government has affirmative duty to fund
certain individual rights, including the right to choose abortion). Sullivan also attacks
other unconstitutional conditions decisions and offers an alternative analysis that focuses
on the systemic effects that benefit conditions have on the distribution of power between
rights-holders and the government. See Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note
226, at 1489-1505.
239. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2818-20 (1992) (joint
opinion). It also notable that Justice Stevens, who would have struck down most of the
Pennsylvania regulations at issue in Casey, reaffirmed the state's right to express its
preference for childbirth through its funding policies. See id. at 2840-41 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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B. The Endorsement Test and the Abortion Undue Burden Standard
1. The Endorsement Test and a Comparison to the Abortion Undue Burden
Standard. - An additional First Amendment doctrine that can supply
useful methods for applying the abortion undue burden standard is the
"endorsement test," one of the analyses applied to determine whether a
government regulation violates the Establishment Clause. Under the en-
dorsement test, regulations are struck down if the "government's actual
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion" or its effect "in fact con-
veys a message of endorsement or disapproval." 240 The Court has vari-
ously defined endorsement as promoting religion or sending a "message
that a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."24' Justice
O'Connor initially offered the endorsement test in her concurrence in
Lynch v. Donelly242 as a reformulation of the three-prong test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.243 Although not adopted by a majority of the Court,
the endorsement test nonetheless has figured prominently in many re-
cent Establishment Clause cases.244
The endorsement test bears several similarities to the abortion un-
due burden standard. The endorsement test, like the undue burden
standard, involves "close factual analysis" rather than reference to fixed
rules.245 The parallel phrasing of the two standards illustrates their simi-
larities: undue burden analysis inquires into whether a regulation "has
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking [a pre-viability abortion],"246 while the endorsement test
examines "whether the challenged governmental practice either has the
240. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'ConnorJ., concurring); see also
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589-94 (1989) (discussing the various
definitions of endorsement used by the Court); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585
(1987) (quotingJustice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
56 (1985) (same). For discussions of the endorsement test, see William P. Marshall, "We
Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 495
(1986); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987).
241. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accord Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
593.
242. 465 U.S. at 612-13.
243. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The endorsement test represents a narrowing of Lemon.
Under the endorsement test, a regulation may be upheld even if its primary effect is to
advance or inhibit religion, provided it does not endorse religion. A non-secular
motivation or government entanglement that does not represent endorsement of religion
in purpose or effect is acceptable. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Under Lemon, a principal effect of advancing or inhibiting religion leads to
invalidation, as does excessive entanglement, even if this entanglement does not amount to
endorsement. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
244. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2664 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring); id.
at 2671-72 (Souter, J., concurring); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-97; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 72.
245. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 606-08, 614 n.60, 629-30; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (every government practice must be judged in its specific
circumstances).
246. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992) (joint opinion).
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purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion."247 The endorsement test also
shares the undue burden standard's concern with effects that pass a cer-
tain threshold, in that the test only condemns entanglements that
amount to endorsement and not entanglements per se, and examines the
overall effect of legislation.248
The differences between the endorsement test and the undue bur-
den standard do not prevent a useful comparison of the two. As was the
case with the dormant Commerce Clause and content-neutral, traditional
forum speech regulations, the endorsement test requires a neutral, even-
handed purpose while in the abortion context the government is allowed
not only to express its preference for childbirth, but also to impose regu-
lations designed to achieve this preference. Yet this difference in accepta-
ble purposes is not as great as it might at first appear. Although Casey
allows states to pursue a preference for childbirth, it forbids legislation
motivated by a desire to hinder abortion; likewise, under the endorse-
ment test, states are allowed to acknowledge the role of religion or pro-
vide benefits to religions but cannot do so if their actions are motivated
by a desire to endorse religion.
A more significant difference concerns the way they approach the
burdens imposed by a regulation. The endorsement test is concerned
with the quality of a legislation's effect, not its quantity or magnitude; the
extent of a law's endorsement of religion is irrelevant. The extent or
quantity of burdens, however, is central to the undue burden standard.
In addition, under the endorsement test the effects of legislation or gov-
ernment actions are measured from the perspective of an average individ-
ual,249 whereas Casey requires assessing burdens from the position of
those women for whom they are a restriction. 250
2. The Inquiy into Purpose and Symbolic Effects. - This difference in
the two standards' approaches to regulatory burdens indicates that the
endorsement test can provide little guidance on how to calculate the ex-
tent of the burden imposed by an abortion regulation. Nonetheless, the
endorsement test can make important contributions to an undue burden
247. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
248. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'ConnorJ, concurring). Although the Lemon
inquiry shares this fact-sensitive character and the focus on purpose and effect, it differs
significantly from the abortion undue burden standard. Lemon bars government
entanglement with religion and ignores the indirect and remote effects of legislation, while
the undue burden standard allows entanglement unless it creates substantial obstacles and
includes incidental effects. Hence the endorsement test is a more appropriate
comparison. Compare Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that to survive an
Establishment Clause challenge a statute's primary or principal effect must not advance
religion and the statute must not create excessive entanglement with religion) with Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2819 (joint opinion) (holding that a state is allowed to create a structural
mechanism to express its preference for childbirth unless the effects of this mechanism,
both intended and incidental, serve to create a substantial obstacle to abortion access).
249. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (plurality opinion) (reasonable observer); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (objective observer).
250. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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standard methodology, specifically techniques for identifying illegitimate
purpose and a recognition of the burdensome character of symbolic ef-
fects. Attempts to apply the purpose prong of the endorsement test have
faced two problems. The first concerns the extent to which a purpose to
endorse religion must be present for the endorsement test to be violated,
and the second the method by which the Court determines legislative
purpose. The Justices who have applied the endorsement test have held
that a purpose to endorse exists only if the goal of endorsing religion was
the government's primary motivation in enacting the law.25 1 Although
these Justices will invalidate laws motivated by this goal even though these
laws also serve secular purposes, they appear to require proof that an
identified illegitimate purpose was strong enough to cause the chal-
lenged act's adoption independent of the legitimate purpose. In other
areas ofjurisprudence the Court often takes the opposite approach; once
a plaintiff has demonstrated the presence of an illegitimate purpose, the
defendant must prove that the legitimate purpose was independently mo-
tivating.252 A possible explanation for this increased deference is that the
legislation can be struck down on the basis of its effects alone in the Es-
tablishment Clause area, whereas in other areas an illegitimate purpose is
required. 253
The Court's approach in determining legislative motivation is also
deferential.254 Yet there are limits to this deference; the Court does not
accept the government's account of its motivation if it concludes this ac-
count is insincere and "a sham."2 55 The Court gives emphasis to the
words of the statute but it also will look beyond the statute's text to en-
sure that a stated purpose is genuine.25 6 The Court has questioned the
genuineness of a stated purpose on the basis of legislative history, the
251. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987); id. at 599 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56, 59; id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
252. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242-44 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270,
n.21 (1977); Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). But
see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2230 (1993)
(suggesting purpose inquiry under Free Exercise and Establishment Clause is parallel to
that used in equal protection cases).
253. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (The "inquiry into the
effect of an enactment would help decide those close cases where the validity of an
expressed purpose is in doubt."). In contrast, illegitimate purpose is required under equal
protection analysis. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (purpose to
discriminate required for equal protection violation).
254. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-87; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
255. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (avowed purpose not sufficient to satisfy
Establishment Clause inquiry).
256. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95. Although the words of a statute are given great
weight, there is no per se rule against statutes which facially foster religious practices since
the Court has held that efforts to accommodate religion do not violate the Establishment
Clause. See Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
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social and historical context of the legislation, and the events leading up
to enactment.257 Remarks by legislators are considered relevant,
although a finding of illegitimate purpose on this basis alone is uncom-
mon.25 8 The Court also has looked to previously existing laws for evi-
dence of the legislature's intent in enacting a new law on the same topic.
For example, the Court relied on the fact that a previous statute estab-
lished daily moments of silence in public schools for prayer when it struck
down a new law creating a moment of silence for meditation and volun-
tary prayer.2 59
The endorsement test's approach to both of these problems in iden-
tifying purpose is well suited to the undue burden inquiry. The purpose
prong of the undue burden inquiry is particularly unclear.260 The Casey
opinion upheld Pennsylvania's recordkeeping requirements on the
grounds that "it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose
other than to make abortions more difficult."26 1 This would suggest that
any legitimate purpose, however inconsequential to the regulation's en-
actment, can satisfy the purpose inquiry. But such an approach would
render the purpose inquiry essentially meaningless, and thus is inconsis-
tent with the decision to introduce the purpose prong in Casey. Adopting
the requirement that a regulation's challengers must prove illegitimate
purpose to be independently motivating would accord with the Court's
apparent desire to treat legislative purpose in the abortion context defer-
entially, while giving some substance to the purpose inquiry. There is a
strong argument for using the endorsement test methodology for deter-
mining motivation as well, because of the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween regulations that aim to create undue burdens and those that simply
seek to express a preference for childbirth. An examination of legislative
history and the context in which the regulations are enacted can help
ensure that the former illegitimate purpose is exposed.2 62 The device of
comparison to existing regulations is particularly helpful. Since many
abortion regulations, such as reporting requirements, are passed ostensi-
bly to serve health goals, a comparison to existing reporting regulations
can demonstrate whether this health motive is sincere and whether it was
the reason for enactment.
A second aspect of the endorsement test analysis is its focus on sym-
bolic effects and psychological pressure. In advocating the endorsement
257. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592-95; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58, 75-77 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
258. But see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58, 75-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
reluctance to base illegitimate purpose on legislative comments but arguing that in this
instance such comments are particularly illuminative).
259. See id. at 58-60.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
261. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2833 (1992) (joint opinion).
262. Such an examination would complement the per se rule of facial invalidity,




test, Justice O'Connor has argued that the danger of endorsement is its
symbolic effect; it "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community .... -"263 Moreover, the
Court has noted the coercive effect of psychological pressure and argued
that "[t]his pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any
overt compulsion."264 Although the Court has been particularly con-
cerned about the psychological pressure in schools, it has noted that such
pressure may be relevant in other contexts as well. 265
This recognition of the importance of symbolic effects and psycho-
logical pressure is also applicable to the abortion undue burden inquiry.
The approach to psychological pressure and symbolic effects in Casey was
remarkably inconsistent; the joint opinion appeared to weigh heavily the
effects of psychological pressure in invalidating the husband notification
requirement, yet made no reference to symbolic effects or psychological
pressure in its examination of the other provisions. It is true that, unlike
the endorsement test, the undue burden inquiry specifically permits sym-
bolic endorsement, since states are allowed to express their preference
for childbirth. But such expressions are prohibited if they amount to un-
due burdens. Hence the state's ability to foster childbirth does not fore-
close an inquiry into the symbolic effects of legislation and the psycholog-
ical pressure such symbolic expressions may cause. 266 Given Casey's
emphasis on actual effects, the Court should examine the symbolic effects
and psychological pressure imposed by regulations as well as their more
overt impact. Indeed, in earlier cases the Court has acknowledged the
coercive power of psychological pressure in the abortion context.267
Inclusion of symbolic effects is particularly relevant in assessing
whether "informed consent" requirements create an undue burden. In
Akron I, the state-mandated physician lecture included the statement that
"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception."268
This statement arguably fulfills Casey's requirement that the information
provided to women must be "truthful [and] nonmisleading" despite its
normative character, yet it clearly has the potential of exerting tremen-
263. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). This
concern with the symbolic effects of legislation runs throughout the Court's references to
the endorsement test, and underlies its insistence that coercion is not required for an
Establishment Clause violation. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627-28
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
264. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658-59 (1992).
265. See id. at 2658 (citing Allegheny for the example of the erection of permanent
religious symbols in government buildings).
266. AsJustice Stevens noted in his Casey dissent, it does not follow from allowing the
state to express a preference for childbirth that the state can express this preference in
ways that coerce the woman's decision. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2840-41 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 762-64 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron,Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S.
416, 443-45 (1983).
268. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 444; see also Field, supra note 44, at 15.
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dous psychological pressure. Such pressure, particularly on minors,
could easily be as great as the pressure to participate in school prayers; in
the abortion context, however, psychological pressure has far more indel-
ible consequences. Nor is the danger of psychological intimidation re-
stricted to normative statements. Rather, as Justice Blackmun noted,
other more objective forms of information such as "graphic literature or
films detailing the performance of an abortion operation" also may inflict
psychological pressure, 269 as may depictions of the developing fetus.
The Court should include all of the symbolic effects of abortion reg-
ulations in its calculations, not only those effects that may exert direct
psychological pressure. For instance, a woman confronted with waiting
periods and "informed consent" requirements when she is seeking an
abortion receives the symbolic message that the government and society
do not trust her decisions. Although this symbolic message may be too
diffuse to exert psychological pressure directly on her decision, it may
undercut her confidence in her choices and make her more accepting of
the state's preferences.2 70 The cumulative effects principle provides an
argument for including such symbolic effects in undue burden calcula-
tions, even if they do not create an undue burden on their own.2 7 1
The endorsement test thus provides two techniques that can be used
in applying the abortion undue burden standard. First, the Court should
examine the legislative history of abortion regulations, the context in
which they were enacted, and the character of previously existing abor-
tion regulations in order to determine whether the regulations were en-
acted in order to hinder access to abortion. This review would be defer-
ential, and the regulations would be struck down only if the Court
determined that this illegitimate purpose was strong enough to motivate
enactment of the regulations independent of the legitimate purposes also
served. But the review would not be so deferential that the mere recita-
tion of a legitimate purpose would satisfy the purpose prong of the undue
burden standard. Second, the Court would include symbolic effects in its
calculation of the impact of abortion regulations. If a regulation exerted
substantial direct psychological pressure on a woman's decision, it would
be struck down as imposing an undue burden even though it did not
impose more overt obstacles on access to abortion. In addition, symbolic
effects creating indirect psychological pressure would be included in un-
due burden calculations.
269. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
270. This symbolic effect also may undercut women's equality in society because of
the way it revives "outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking
capacity of women." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2842 (Stevens,J, concurring in pari and dissenting
in part).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 181-192.
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IV. A RE-EXAMINATION OF CASEY
This examination of the two-tiered dormant Commerce Clause in-
quiry, the content-neutral, traditional forum analysis, and the endorse-
ment test has suggested several techniques that could be used to con-
struct a new methodology for the undue burden standard. These
techniques are the per se rule of facial invalidity, the surrogacy test, the
cumulative effects principle, an emphasis on the impact of regulations on
poor women, a general investigation of motivating purpose, and an inclu-
sion of symbolic effects. The new undue burden methodology would in-
volve a two-step analysis, first inquiring into the purpose behind an abor-
tion regulation and second calculating its effects. Re-examining some of
the Pennsylvania abortion regulations challenged in Casey will illustrate
this more rigorous undue burden methodology. It will also demonstrate
how the Casey framework could be altered to provide protection against
unnecessary but not undue burdens on access to abortion.
A. The Contours of a New Undue Burden Methodology
The new undue burden methodology would consist of a two-step
analysis. The first step would be an inquiry into the purpose behind en-
actment of an abortion regulation to determine whether this purpose was
to create a substantial obstacle to abortion access. This purpose inquiry
would involve application of the per se rule against facially undue bur-
dens and a more general investigation into the motivation behind a regu-
lation. Under the per se rule of facial invalidity, any abortion regulation
that facially displayed an intention to impose substantial obstacles or to
hinder access to pre-viability abortions would be invalidated unless the
state could prove that the regulation was motivated by a legitimate pur-
pose and would not create undue burdens. Since the per se rule is an
evidentiary device used to flush out an illegitimate purpose, the entire
regulation would be invalidated when the per se rule is violated, even if
this violation is limited to a specific provision. As part of the general
investigation into motivating purpose, the Court would examine the legis-
lative history of an abortion regulation, the context in which it was en-
acted, and the regulations that existed prior to its enactment. If the
Court determined that the illegitimate purpose of imposing substantial
obstacles to abortion access independently caused the regulation's enact-
ment, it would invalidate the regulation.
The purpose prong inquiry belongs first for reasons ofjudicial econ-
omy. The two methods suggested for the purpose prong-the per se rule
against facially undue burdens and the general investigation of motivat-
ing purpose-are both limited inquiries that do not involve factual analy-
sis. Since failure to satisfy the purpose prong results in invalidation of the
regulations, initial application of these methods may forestall detailed ex-
amination of the record. For similar reasons, the per se rule of facial
invalidity should be employed before the general investigation into legis-
lative purpose. The per se rule involves only an examination of legislative
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text, whereas the general investigation extends to an examination of legis-
lative history and context.
If the regulation survives application of the per se rule and the gen-
eral investigation of motivating purpose, then the Court would proceed
to the second step of analysis-calculating the effects of the regulation.
The methods for this calculation are the surrogacy test, the cumulative
effects principle, the emphasis on the effects of regulations on poor wo-
men, and the inclusion of symbolic effects. These methods can be seen
as creating a four-stage inquiry into a regulation's effects. First, the Court
would examine the actual effects of each separate provision, including
incidental and symbolic effects, to establish whether the regulation cre-
ated a substantial obstacle to abortion access. If a regulation imposed
increased costs, whether these costs are slight or substantial would be de-
termined based on their impact on poor women. Second, the actual ef-
fects of each provision would be examined under the rationality-with-bite
approach to determine whether the regulation in fact advances a legiti-
mate state purpose.272 In the third stage, the Court would examine the
cumulative effects of all of the provisions and of the new regulation in
combination with existing regulations to determine if the total impact of
the regulation created an undue burden. Lastly, any restriction on mi-
nors would be subjected to careful examination under the surrogacy test,
to establish whether the restriction would serve minors' interests and
whether it would provide an adequate judicial bypass.
B. The New Undue Burden Methodology and Casey
The contours of this new undue burden methodology become more
apparent through an application of the methodology to the Pennsylvania
abortion regulations challenged in Casey. These regulations mandated
anti-abortion lectures by physicians, twenty-four hour waiting periods,
husband notification, informed parental consent, and extensive record-
keeping and contained a narrow exception for medical emergencies. 273
1. The Purpose Inquiry. - The analysis of the regulations under the
new methodology begins with an inquiry into their motivating purpose,
achieved by applying the per se rule against facial invalidity and the gen-
eral investigation of legislative motivation. This inquiry suggests that the
Court might well have concluded that the purpose motivating the Penn-
sylvania regulations was a desire to hinder women's access to abortion
rather than to inform their choice. However, as discussed below, the con-
fusion created by the Court's decision in Webster prevents invalidation of
the Pennsylvania regulations on the basis of purpose alone.
272. This second stage does not include comparing a regulation to alternative
measures, because such a comparison would exceed the confines of rationality review, even
the rationality-with-bite variety. An examination of alternatives cannot be incorporated
into the undue burden methodology without altering the outline of the undue burden
standard as enunciated in Casey. See infra part LV.C.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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Most of the Pennsylvania requirements do not trigger the per se rule,
since it is not clear from their language that they will create substantial
obstacles to abortion access. The one exception is the medical emer-
gency provision. According to the Court, any regulation that prevents an
abortion where there is a significant risk to the woman's health is an un-
due burden.274 The Pennsylvania medical emergency provision by its
terms imposes a narrower exception; there must be a serious risk of sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment to a major bodily function for the
provision to apply.275 As a result, this provision appears to facially impose
an undue burden. In order to avoid this conclusion it is necessary to
construe the terms of the provision quite broadly, as covering all signifi-
cant health risks whether or not a risk of substantial and irreversible im-
pairment exists. Indeed, the Supreme Court took such an approach in
sustaining the provision, as did the Third Circuit.276 Under the new
methodology, however, such a broad interpretation would be prohibited
by the per se rule, on the grounds that broad interpretations ignore im-
portant evidence of legislative purpose. Applying the per se rule, the
state should bear the burden of proving that the regulation was motivated
by a legitimate purpose and not that of seeking to protect fetal life even at
the cost of some significant risk to the woman. In addition, the state
would have to show that the exception does not create an undue burden.
Pennsylvania might argue that the purpose behind the exception was
purely to protect women against health risks that they might face as a
result of the other abortion regulations. But the statutory language
defeats this defense, for if Pennsylvania's goal were simply to protect wo-
men's health, it would have adopted a broader exception. The legislative
history also indicates that in fact the legislature believed the life of the
fetus to be more important than the health of the woman.277 A more
viable defense for the state would be to claim that its legislature was un-
sure of the level of health risks that would be constitutional, given the
indications in Webster that Roe might soon be overruled. This defense is
supported by the substantial discussion of the import of Webster in the
legislative history.278 It should be noted, however, that this defense
would only apply to Pennsylvania, and not to states that enacted abortion
regulations after Casey resolved the confusion created by Webster.279
274. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (majority opinion).
275. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3203 (Supp. 1994).
276. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (majority opinion) (adopting the statutory
interpretation offered by the Third Circuit).
277. See Pa. Legis.Journal-House 20 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989) (sponsor of regulations
arguing that "when it is health against the life of the baby, then it comes down in favor of
the unborn baby").
278. See id. at 19-25.
279. Since Casey several states have adopted the statutory language of the
Pennsylvania medical exception rather than the broader interpretation of that language by
the Supreme Court, and without explicit acknowledgement that the Casey interpretation
applies. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.17015(d) (West Supp. 1994); Utah Code
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Pennsylvania could then argue that the provision would not create an
undue burden through its effects, because all medical conditions which
create a significant risk to the woman's health impose the requisite risk of
substantial and irreversible harm in some circumstances. Therefore, all
of these conditions would trigger the medical emergency provision.280
Since the per se rule is not clearly violated, the analysis should pro-
ceed to the general investigation of motivating purpose. This investiga-
tion focuses on legislative history, the social and historical context of the
regulations, and previously existing laws, although reliance on legislative
comments alone is discouraged. In this instance, the legislative history
displays a longstanding attempt to impose restrictions on abortion, with
the re-enactment of provisions that had previously been held unconstitu-
tional. Pennsylvania's 1982 abortion regulations also contained "in-
formed consent" and waiting period requirements, and these require-
ments were struck down.28' The fact that Pennsylvania had re-enacted
provisions deemed unconstitutional suggests that the motivation behind
the regulations was to impose substantial obstacles to abortion access and
not simply to encourage childbirth. Again, however, the confusion cre-
ated by Webster may forestall the conclusion that Pennsylvania was moti-
vated by an illegitimate purpose. The legislative history demonstrates
that several legislators believed the 1982 regulations would be held consti-
tutional after Webster.282 There is also evidence in the legislative history
that the legislature desired to deter abortions. For example, the sponsor
of the 1989 legislation repeatedly expressed his view that abortion was
killing and should be prohibited.283 But it is unclear whether the legisla-
ture hoped to deter abortions by hindering access or by encouraging wo-
men to choose childbirth. The existence of such ambiguous evidence of
purpose in the legislative history, combined with the deferential attitude
of the inquiry into legislative purpose, prevents the conclusion that the
illegitimate purpose of imposing undue burdens on access to abortion
was an independent motivation for the regulations.
2. The Calculation of Effects. - The next step under the new method-
ology is to calculate the effect of abortion regulations in order to deter-
Ann. § 76-7-301(2) (Supp. 1994). These provisions appear to violate the per se rule and
would cause the invalidation of the statute as a whole under the new methodology.
280. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822 (majority opinion).
281. See Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (noting that the waiting period and informed consent provisions of the 1989 Act
were very similar to those in the 1982 Act, which had been invalidated).
282. See Pa. Legis. Journal-House 19-25 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989). This
understanding of Webster was shared by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which applied
the undue burden standard as enunciated by Justice O'Connor in her earlier opinions to
the new Pennsylvania regulations. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 691-98
(1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
283. See Pa. Legis.Journal-House 11-19 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1989).
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mine whether in practice they create a substantial obstacle to abortion
access. The first stage of such a calculation is to examine each provision
separately and establish whether the actual and symbolic effects of the
provision create a substantial obstacle.
The factual record compiled by the district court indicates several
ways in which the Pennsylvania requirements might create obstacles to
abortion access. The state-mandated lecture requirement would leave
physicians with less time to perform abortions, so that clinics would need
to either expand physicians' schedules or hire additional physicians to
provide the same level of abortion services. 28 4 Both of these alternatives
would lead to an increase in operating costs which would be passed on to
patients.28 5 In addition, the severe shortage of abortion providers nation-
wide suggests that the second alternative might not be available. 286 A
decline in the level of abortion services leads to longer delays for women
seeking abortions. In some cases, for example where women are preg-
nant with anomalous fetuses, the information may have a deleterious psy-
chological effect and cause "undesirable and unnecessary anxiety,
anguish and fear."287 The physician must provide the information, even
if she believes it will have a negative psychological effect, unless she can
prove this negative psychological impact will constitute a severely adverse
effect on the life or health of the woman or unless a medical emergency
exists.2 88
State-mandated lectures, particularly combined with a mandatory
waiting period, may also exert coercive psychological pressure. The lec-
ture may convey the symbolic message that the state does not trust wo-
men to make an informed and deliberative decision,289 and thereby lead
women to doubt their ability to determine their best interests. The po-
tential for psychological pressure is magnified by the fact that the lecture
is, at least in part, conducted by a physician prior to an invasive medical
procedure. In such a context, a woman may feel compelled to ask for all
the materials offered to her, may pay particular heed to what her doctor
tells her, and may be especially vulnerable because of anxiety about the
upcoming procedure.
There was substantial evidence in the record that the mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting period will create an undue burden. The wait-
284. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1353, 1380.
285. See id. The record did not indicate how large this increase would be.
286. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United
States, 1991 and 1992, 26 Fam. Plan. Persp. 100, 103 (1994) (84 percent of all U.S.
counties, and 94 percent of nonmetropolitan counties, had no identified abortion
provider in 1992); Clinic Works to Find Doctor for Abortions, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov.
27, 1992, at B6 (reporting the difficulties a Pennsylvania clinic faced in finding physicians
willing to perform abortion services).
287. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1354.
288. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (Supp. 1994).
289. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2841-42 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing period forces women who travel to reach an abortion provider to
double their travel time and expense, or pay the additional cost of staying
overnight near the provider. The district court found that forty-two per-
cent of the women who received abortions in Pennsylvania in 1988 had to
travel at least one hour, and sometimes more than three hours, to reach
the nearest abortion provider. Other potential costs were lost wages from
having to take an additional day off work or payment for additional child-
care. Moreover, these costs will be particularly burdensome for poor wo-
men.2 90 In some instances, it may be possible to shift the increased costs
of regulations onto wealthier women or women who have insurance cov-
erage for abortion. But in this case such shifting is not possible; poor
women who must travel to reach an abortion provider cannot avoid pay-
ing increased costs. The district court further found that the resulting
delays would in fact extend from forty-eight hours to two weeks rather
than the mandated twenty-four hours, because of the schedules of abor-
tion clinics. Delays also increase costs indirectly, by pushing some pa-
tients into the second trimester.291 The health risks of abortion also in-
crease with delays, again particularly if delays result in second trimester
abortions. Delays also can cause psychological harm, and the need to
make two visits to abortion providers increases the psychological pressure
from harassment.292
The Pennsylvania regulations mandate that abortion providers file
detailed reports that list information on the patient, the clinic where the
abortion was performed, and the names of the physician performing the
abortion and the referring physician. These records will be made public
if the provider has received public funds within the last year.29 3 The dis-
trict court held that the fear of physician harassment and of potential
attacks on their clinics would lead abortion providers not to accept any
public funds.294 Public funds are available for women on public assist-
ance if the pregnancy endangers their lives or results from reported rape
or incest. 295 All of the clinics challenging the regulations accepted such
payments as payment in full.296 Thus the requirement that these reports
be made public would substantially increase the costs of an abortion for
women who qualify for abortion funding, and on this ground would cre-
ate an undue burden. The requirement that the names of referring phy-
sicians must be reported is also burdensome. Evidence in the record
290. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1351-52.
291. Delays may also impact the hardest on poor women, because many poor women
are forced to delay scheduling their abortions initially because of their financing
difficulties. See NARAL, Promoting Reproductive Choices, supra note 164, at 30.
292. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
293. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3214 (Supp. 1994).
294. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1366-68.
295. See NARAL, Who Decides?, supra note 216, at 106.
296. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1334-41.
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showed that many physicians would refuse to refer patients for abortions
if their names were listed, for fear of anti-abortion harassment. 297
The husband notification requirement was the only requirement
struck down by the Supreme Court in Casey. As the Casey opinion noted,
considerable evidence was presented on the effect that notification re-
quirements have on abused women, such as the fact that notification of
pregnancy is connected to increased abuse. Marital problems, often in-
volving violence, are the primary reason women give for not notifying
their husbands when the husband is the father. Exceptions to the notifi-
cation requirement were narrow; for instance, the pregnancy from sexual
assault exception could only be used if the woman had reported the as-
sault within ninety days. The requirement would also be burdensome for
women who did not wish to inform their husbands for other reasons,
such as that the husband was not the father or that the husband would try
to pressure her into having the baby or retaliate against her.298
In the second stage of the new methodology, the separate provisions
are reviewed to ensure that they are rational. The type of rationality re-
view applied is the rationality-with-bite approach, which requires that the
regulations actually serve to foster their stated aim.299 According to the
undue burden standard, rationality review need not be applied to provi-
sions deemed to create substantial obstacles; rather, these provisions are
automatically invalidated. Nonetheless, applying rationality review may
still be useful since it can serve to buttress the conclusion that regulations
should be invalidated.
There is a strong argument for concluding that the physician coun-
selling requirement and some of the reporting requirements are not ra-
tional measures. The factual record indicates that all of the clinics chal-
lenging the regulations currently require counselling to ensure that
women are comfortable with their decision to have an abortion. These
counselling sessions are conducted by trained counsellors who often hold
advanced degrees, and material on alternatives to abortion is usually
available. 00 The district court found that these counsellors would be
more understanding than physicians and would have more time to spend
with patients.8 0' Both the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists and the American Public Health Association officially favor the
use of trained counsellors to provide abortion counselling.30 2 Although
the Casey opinion held that the reporting requirement served the public
interest in preserving health, there is no evidence in the record of a
health benefit from reporting the name of the referring physician. The
Federal Standard Report, which is a model for abortion reporting, does
297. See id. at 1370-71.
298. See id. at 2826-30.
299. See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying text.
300. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1335-42.
301. See id. at 1353.
302. See id. at 1352.
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not require the name of the referring physician. 30 3 Since these require-
ments yield no actual benefits, they would fail to pass rationality
review.3 0 4
Similar claims could be made about much of the information that
must be supplied and the waiting period requirement, but with less suc-
cess. Given the evidence in the record that information on fetal develop-
ment may cause psychological harm, the Casey opinion's claim that the
mandated lecture and materials will serve the goal of psychological well-
being is dubious.3 0 5 It is also apparent that some of the mandated infor-
mation could be misleading if not presented realistically, and thus actu-
ally could impede informed consent. For example, many women may not
be eligible for medical assistance benefits for childbirth. The record con-
tains evidence that most women give careful thought to the decision to
have an abortion and have already decided that an abortion is in their
best interests prior to scheduling an appointment. Few women display
ambivalence about this decision in counselling.3 0 6 Particularly for those
women who refuse the materials made available, the waiting period seems
little designed to advance their deliberations. But these measures may
also convince some women to forego an abortion and therefore cannot
be found to be irrational if the state's broader purpose is to foster
childbirth.
Lastly, the husband notification requirement also fails rationality re-
view. The Casey opinion denied that husband notification requirements
for abortion serve a legitimate interest, instead finding that these require-
ments are based on sexist ideas about a wife's dependence on her hus-
band. According to the Court, "parental notification or consent require-
ments.., are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will
benefit from consultation with their parents .... We cannot adopt a
parallel assumption about adult women."30 7
In the third stage of the new methodology the cumulative burden of
the separate provisions is assessed. Again, this stage need not be reached
if all of the provisions considered separately create undue burdens or fail
rationality review, but an examination of the regulation's cumulative ef-
fects will often add support to such conclusions. Each provision increases
the costs of abortion, and their combined costs are even more substantial.
This cumulative cost is exacerbated by the fact that Pennsylvania does not
provide funding for abortions in general, does not cover most abortions
for state employees, does not allow abortions to be performed at public
303. See id. at 1370.
304. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2851-52 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
305. See id. at 2823 (joint opinion) (stating that informing women of the effect of an
abortion on a fetus may reduce the risk of post-abortion psychological trauma).
306. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1351, 1354.
307. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830. The Court did not apply rationality review to this
requirement because it found that the provision created an undue burden.
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facilities and forbids post-viability abortions except in extreme circum-
stances.3 08 The undue burden that these increased costs would create is
demonstrated by examining the financial barriers on abortion access
even before the new regulations. The record demonstrated that the vast
majority of the clinics challenging the regulations reduced the cost of
abortions for women who usually receive medical assistance from the
state but would not be eligible for abortion coverage.30 9 Even with such
reductions, poor women paid at least $170 and potentially as much $650
for an abortion, depending on the clinic and the stage of the preg-
nancy.3 10 The national poverty threshold was $11,186 for a single woman
and two children in 1993, so that before the regulations were enacted an
abortion might represent between twenty and seventy-five percent of the
monthly income of poor women.3 1 ' Hence, seemingly small increases in
the costs of abortions might push abortion services out of the reach of
many poor women.3 12
The fourth stage of the new methodology, based on the logic of the
surrogacy test, singles out restrictions on minors for special scrutiny. This
aspect of the proposed methodology represents perhaps the greatest dif-
ference from the approach the Court took in Casey. The joint opinion
allotted the parental consent requirement only three paragraphs' discus-
sion.3 1 3 But the requirement that parent consent must be "informed" is
problematic. This requirement does not increase familial communica-
tion and support when applied to parents who have already given their
consent. The district court found that the "informed consent" require-
ment will require a parent to come to the clinic with the minor for the
mandated lecture, and that this may lead to delay because of a parent's
schedule. The district court also found that delays are particularly bur-
densome for minors, because minors often become aware of their
pregnancies later than adult women. The health risk of second trimester
308. See NARAL, Who Decides?, supra note 216, at 105-06.
309. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1334-42.
310. See id.
311. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population
Reports: Poverty in the United States: 1992, at vii (1993). The poverty thresholds are
calculated according to household size; thus $11,186 represents the threshold for a family
of three, $14,335 the threshold for a family of four and $7,143 the threshold for a single
person. See also Alan Guttmacher Institute, Issues in Brief: August 1993, at 2 (Aug. 1993)(Table) (the average cost of an abortion is 59 percent of the maximum monthly AFDC
payment in Pennsylvania, which is $421 for a family of three).
312. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, 12 percent of women in
Pennsylvania have incomes below the poverty line in 1993. For women aged 12 to 17, 14.2
percent have incomes below the poverty line; for women aged 18 to 64, 11.2 percent have
incomes below the poverty line.
313. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (joint opinion);
see also The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, supra note 58, at 206-10 (criticizing the Court's
application of the undue burden standard to Pennsylvania's informed consent
requirement). Another example of the limited review of minors' restrictions is Barnes v.
Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir. 1993).
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abortions is much greater for minors, and minors react more negatively
to delays.3 14 Because of their age, minors may also be more susceptible to
coercive psychological pressure.
This examination of the effect of the Pennsylvania regulations using
the new methodology suggests that many of the regulations create an un-
due burden. Because of their effect on costs, the waiting period and phy-
sician counselling requirements may represent substantial obstacles on
their own. The requirement that parental consent must be "informed"
should also be invalidated as creating an undue burden. The physician
counselling requirement and referring physician reporting requirements
should be struck down as irrational. The burdens individually imposed
by other measures, such as the provision of information on fetal develop-
ment, are less clear; however, there is a strong basis for concluding that
the regulation as a whole creates an undue burden. Some regulations,
such as the requirement that abortion providers provide information on
the risks of abortion and carrying a pregnancy to term and basic report-
ing requirements should be sustained if severable from the other
provisions.
It is important to realize that these conclusions do not merely repre-
sent a philosophical disagreement with the Court's assessment of the ef-
fects of the regulations or the proper scope for state restrictions on abor-
tion. Instead, these conclusions result from employing a conceptually
similar but more rigorous undue burden methodology. Several of the
effects considered here were not mentioned by the Court, for instance
the negative psychological impact of fetal depictions and the refusal of
physicians to make abortion referrals if the fact that they do so becomes
public. Other effects, most centrally the impact of increased costs, are
weighed differently because the new methodology stipulates that costs
should be assessed from the perspective of poor women. Lastly, the joint
opinion authors performed no cumulative assessment of burdens and
only a minimal rationality review.
C. Narrow Tailoring and the Abortion Undue Burden Standard
The new undue burden methodology accords with the structure of
the undue burden standard as enunciated in Casey, although in practice
the new methodology leads to very different results. It is also worthwhile
to consider the effects of altering the structure of the undue burden stan-
dard to address the lack of protection against unnecessary but not undue
burdens. The comparison of the undue burden standard and the three
other constitutional models demonstrated that, lacking balancing or an
examination of alternative regulations, the undue burden standard is
unique in its failure to protect against burdens that are unnecessary to
achieve the government's purpose but do not rise to the level of undue
burdens. The lack of protection is reinforced by the fact that the state
314. See Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1355-58.
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can express its preference for childbirth, since this ability makes it diffi-
cult to invalidate regulations on purpose or rationality review.
The Casey joint opinion clearly states that all regulations not found
to impose an undue burden will only be subjected to rationality review,
where there is no comparison of alternatives. Although the rationality-
with-bite approach examines the actual effects of a regulation, it does not
look outside of the confines of the enacted regulation. Thus any attempt
to include a comparison of alternatives in order to address the lack of
protection against unnecessary but not undue burdens will not accord
with the Casey undue burden framework. Nevertheless, it is useful to see
what effect a weak narrow tailoring requirement, such as that found in
content-neutral, traditional forum analysis, would have on the review of
abortion regulations. This version of narrow tailoring only requires an
inquiry into whether equally effective, less burdensome alternatives exist;
it does not allow the Court to strike down regulations that it believes on
balance are too burdensome or otherwise unjustified.
The effects of a narrow tailoring requirement can again best be seen
by applying this requirement to some of the provisions at issue in Casey.
Any measure that fails rationality review also would fail the narrow tailor-
ing requirement, but the converse is not true. As discussed above, there
was strong evidence in Casey that the mandated anti-abortion lecture im-
posed unnecessary burdens. However, the measure would likely satisfy
rationality review because it allowed the state to express a preference for
childbirth. But under the narrow tailoring requirement the mandated
lecture would likely be struck down because of the availability of equally
effective alternatives that are less burdensome. For example, a state
could make materials expressing this preference generally available, allow
a woman to choose not to hear the state-mandated lecture or provide
wide discretion to counselors not to provide the lecture if they believe it
will be harmful. The usefulness of an examination of alternatives is also
evident in regard to the waiting period requirement. It is important to
recognize that the waiting period requirement would survive rationality-
with-bite review, even though this requirement would likely be struck
down as imposing a substantial obstacle to abortion access under the new
methodology. The fact that equally effective and less burdensome meas-
ures are available provides additional support for such invalidation. One
such alternative is a waiting period requirement that commences with the
patient's initial telephone contact with the abortion provider. The
Eighth Circuit recently upheld a waiting period provision in North Da-
kota, relying on an opinion by the state Attorney General which claimed
the provision was satisfied by telephone counselling.3 15
315. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1994).
However, this type of counselling requirement may be more likely to be deemed irrational
since the absence of face-to-fhce contact might lessen the quality of the counselling.
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Although the narrow tailoring requirement is not consistent with the
undue burden framework enunciated in Casey, it would not radically alter
the balance the joint opinion sought to strike between the interests of the
woman and the interests of the state. It would serve mainly to reinforce
the rationality review already contained within the undue burden
standard.
CONCLUSION
The undue burden standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Casey was based on the principle that the Constitution protects the right
to choose abortion. It is necessary to have a methodology for applying
the undue burden standard to ensure that this protection exists not just
in theory but also in fact. This Note has sought to develop such a meth-
odology by drawing on the techniques used in other constitutional mod-
els. The combined use of the per se rule against facially undue burdens
and a general investigation of purpose offers a means of giving subs-ance
to the purpose prong of the undue burden standard. Enhanced rational-
ity review, as well as an examination of cumulative and symbolic effects
and a focus on the impact of regulations on poor women, helps to struc-
ture the inquiry under the effects prong. The surrogacy test indicates
when careful scrutiny of restrictions on minors is particularly necessary.
While these methods provide greater guidance, they are not suffi-
cient to protect women against unnecessary but not undue burdens. For
such protection to exist, an examination of alternatives and a narrow tai-
loring requirement must be added to the abortion undue burden stan-
dard. Without such a requirement the protection of abortion rights will
be substantially less than the protection offered to other rights under
comparable constitutional standards.
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